共同基金管理中的自身利益:一个案例研究

Carlos F. Alves, V. Mendes
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引用次数: 0

摘要

先前的研究得出结论,共同基金的客户确实存在不对称的业绩反应。这种行为给基金经理提供了优化基金自身利益的机会。使用来自金融系统的独特数据库,其中商业利益,投资银行业务和投资组合管理集中在同一个银行集团,我们表明共同基金倾向于表现出偏向的投资组合,即集团母公司的金融资产超过其他金融资产持有。这不能用业绩、风险或证券的特性来解释,也与共同基金管理中存在自利的假设是一致的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Self-Interest on Mutual Fund Management: A Case Study
Previous research has concluded that mutual funds' clients do have asymmetric performance reactions. Such behavior gives the fund manager the opportunity to optimize the fund's own interests. Using a unique database from a financial system wherein commercial interests, investment banking and portfolio management are concentrated in the same banking group, we show that mutual funds tend to exhibit biased portfolios, i.e., financial assets of the group's parent company outweigh other financial asset holdings. This cannot be explained by performance, risk or securities' characteristics, and is consistent with the hypothesis of the existence of self-interest on mutual fund management.
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