简单身份验证SIP请求管理的改进

Hisashi Takahara, Motonori Nakamura
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引用次数: 2

摘要

SIP是一种流行的信令协议。在SIP协议中,RFC4474 (SIP Identity)[3]用于验证从代理到被调用方终端的流的完整性,RFC3261 (Proxy Authenticate)[1]用于确保从调用方终端到代理的流的真实性。但是,代理身份验证仅确保真实性,不能验证流的完整性。因此,从调用者终端到代理的流本质上容易受到中间人(MITM)攻击。在本文中,提出了一种新的方法,使验证SIP流的完整性成为可能,而无需像PKI那样需要大量的工作。通过将该方法与SIP Identity相结合,实现了比仅使用SIP Identity更容易地在端到端路径上验证SIP信令流的完整性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Exhancements for a Simple Authenticated SIP Request Management
SIP is a popular signaling protocol. In SIP, RFC4474 (SIP Identity) [3] is used to verify integrity of a flow from a Proxy to a terminal of a callee while RFC3261 (Proxy Authenticate) [1] is used to ensure authenticity of a flow from a terminal of a caller to a Proxy. However Proxy Authenticate only ensures authenticity and cannot verify the integrity of a flow. Thus, the flow from a terminal of caller to a proxy is inherently vulnerable to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. In this paper, a new method is proposed that makes it possible to verify integrity of a SIP flow from a terminal of a callee to a proxy without such a significant effort as PKI requires. By combining this method and SIP Identity, it is realized to verify integrity of SIP signaling flow over the while end-to-end path more easily than using only SIP Identity.
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