传统与现代家庭再分配的政治经济学

V. Meier, Matthew D. Rablen
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们分析了一个模型,在这个模型中,家庭可能是在家里照顾孩子的“传统”单收入家庭,也可能是使用市场托儿服务的“现代”双收入家庭。家庭政策可能偏向于其中一个群体,比如市场医疗补贴vs现金医疗。政策是由概率投票决定的,其中分配影响很重要,无论是在群体内部还是在群体之间。更高的现代家庭比例——这可能是由社会规范的变化或性别工资不平等的变化引起的——可能具有非单调效应,当传统家庭比例非常低或非常高时,其净补贴较低,而在某个中间阶段,补贴较高。这也许可以解释在发展的后期,当大多数选民来自现代家庭时,现金换医疗政策的实施和随后的紧缩,在挪威和瑞典可以观察到。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Political Economy of Redistribution between Traditional and Modern Families
We analyse a model in which families may either be ‘traditional’ single-earner that care for the child at home or be ‘ modern’ double-earner households that use market child care. Family policies may favour one or the other group, like market care subsidies vs. cash-for-care. Policies are determined by probabilistic voting, where distributional impacts matter, both within and across groups. A higher share of modern households—which can be induced by changes in social norms or by changes in gender wage inequality—may have non-monotone effects, with lower net subsidies to traditional households when their share is very low or very high, and higher subsidies in some intermediate stage. This may explain the implementation of cash-for-care policies and their subsequent tightening in late stages of development, when most voters come from modern households, observed in Norway and Sweden.
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