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引用次数: 16
摘要
在本文中,我首先简要叙述了全球金融危机(GFC)的起因和后果。当然,触发事件是次贷危机的爆发;然而,我认为,金融体系已经如此脆弱,几乎任何事情都可能导致崩溃。然后,我将对我们应该吸取的教训进行评估。简而言之,这些问题包括:(a)全球金融危机不是流动性危机;(b)承销问题;(c)不受监管和不受监管的金融机构自然演变为控制欺诈;(d)最糟糕的部分是掩盖罪行。我认为,除非我们开始追究欺诈行为,否则我们无法解决这场危机。最后,我将根据海曼·明斯基(Hyman P. Minsky)的研究提出一个改革议程。
Lessons We Should Have Learned from the Global Financial Crisis but Didn’t
In this paper, I first quickly recount the causes and consequences of the global financial crisis (GFC). Of course, the triggering event was the unfolding of the subprime crisis; however, I argue that the financial system was already so fragile that just about anything could have caused the collapse. I then move on to an assessment of the lessons we should have learned. Briefly, these include: (a) the GFC was not a liquidity crisis, (b) underwriting matters, (c) unregulated and unsupervised financial institutions naturally evolve into control frauds, and (d) the worst part is the cover-up of the crimes. I argue that we cannot resolve the crisis until we begin going after the fraud. Finally, I outline an agenda for reform, along the lines suggested by the work of Hyman P. Minsky.