{"title":"分歧和揭穿","authors":"N. Ballantyne","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190847289.003.0005","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"When we learn that other people reject our views, we may gain reasons to change our minds. One common response to our opponents is to attribute biases to them. But “debunking” our opponents sometimes looks dubious because we tend to believe our own judgments are less prone to bias than other people’s judgments, even when that is probably not correct. This chapter defends the idea that we should be less inclined to treat others as more biased than we are ourselves. As a result, we must face the fact that their disagreement cannot be so easily dismissed.","PeriodicalId":345622,"journal":{"name":"Knowing Our Limits","volume":"28 25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Disagreement and Debunking\",\"authors\":\"N. Ballantyne\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/oso/9780190847289.003.0005\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"When we learn that other people reject our views, we may gain reasons to change our minds. One common response to our opponents is to attribute biases to them. But “debunking” our opponents sometimes looks dubious because we tend to believe our own judgments are less prone to bias than other people’s judgments, even when that is probably not correct. This chapter defends the idea that we should be less inclined to treat others as more biased than we are ourselves. As a result, we must face the fact that their disagreement cannot be so easily dismissed.\",\"PeriodicalId\":345622,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Knowing Our Limits\",\"volume\":\"28 25 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-10-31\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Knowing Our Limits\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190847289.003.0005\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Knowing Our Limits","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190847289.003.0005","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
When we learn that other people reject our views, we may gain reasons to change our minds. One common response to our opponents is to attribute biases to them. But “debunking” our opponents sometimes looks dubious because we tend to believe our own judgments are less prone to bias than other people’s judgments, even when that is probably not correct. This chapter defends the idea that we should be less inclined to treat others as more biased than we are ourselves. As a result, we must face the fact that their disagreement cannot be so easily dismissed.