{"title":"攻击纯加密配置下的IPsec标准","authors":"Jean Paul Degabriele, K. Paterson","doi":"10.1109/SP.2007.8","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We describe new attacks which break any RFC- compliant implementation of IPsec making use of encryption-only ESP in tunnel mode. The new attacks are both efficient and realistic: they are ciphertext-only and need only the capability to eavesdrop on ESP-encrypted traffic and to inject traffic into the network. We report on our experiences in applying the attacks to a variety of implementations of IPsec.","PeriodicalId":131863,"journal":{"name":"2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07)","volume":"151 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2007-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"73","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Attacking the IPsec Standards in Encryption-only Configurations\",\"authors\":\"Jean Paul Degabriele, K. Paterson\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/SP.2007.8\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We describe new attacks which break any RFC- compliant implementation of IPsec making use of encryption-only ESP in tunnel mode. The new attacks are both efficient and realistic: they are ciphertext-only and need only the capability to eavesdrop on ESP-encrypted traffic and to inject traffic into the network. We report on our experiences in applying the attacks to a variety of implementations of IPsec.\",\"PeriodicalId\":131863,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07)\",\"volume\":\"151 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2007-05-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"73\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2007.8\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2007.8","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Attacking the IPsec Standards in Encryption-only Configurations
We describe new attacks which break any RFC- compliant implementation of IPsec making use of encryption-only ESP in tunnel mode. The new attacks are both efficient and realistic: they are ciphertext-only and need only the capability to eavesdrop on ESP-encrypted traffic and to inject traffic into the network. We report on our experiences in applying the attacks to a variety of implementations of IPsec.