基于模块化结构的密码协处理器研究与开发基于功率的侧信道攻击对策

Mateusz Korona, T. Wojciechowski, M. Rawski, P. Tomaszewicz
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引用次数: 2

摘要

在现代信息处理系统中,保证数据的保密性和安全传输是一个极其重要的问题。然而,即使是最安全的加密算法,如果它的实现没有考虑到信息泄漏的威胁,可能是不够的。对不安全的设备进行攻击可能非常简单,而且可能不需要昂贵的硬件。因此,研究和开发针对此类攻击的对策非常重要。本文提出了一个环境,旨在促进研究、开发和评估保护加密原语硬件实现免受基于功耗分析的侧信道攻击的对策。该环境由模块化架构的硬件加密协处理器、数据传输层和组态层以及用于设计验证的软件试验台组成。不同的加密原语(块密码、哈希函数、校验和)与基本对策一起实现。还介绍了功耗近似的常用方法。整个环境的能力评估证明,硬件架构和测试平台为研究和开发基于功率的侧信道攻击的对策提供了易于扩展和通用的框架。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Cryptographic Coprocessor with Modular Architecture for Research and Development of Countermeasures Against Power-Based Side-Channel Attacks
In modern information processing systems, ensuring confidentiality and secure data transmission is an extremely important issue. However, even the most secure cryptographic algorithm may be insufficient, if its implementation does not take into account the threat of information leak through side-channels. Performing an attack on an unsecured device can be very simple and may not require expensive hardware. For this reason research and development of countermeasures against such attacks is very important.This paper presents an environment designed to facilitate research, development and evaluation of countermeasures protecting hardware implementation of cryptographic primitives against side-channel attacks based on power consumption analysis.The environment is composed of hardware cryptographic coprocessor with modular architecture, data transfer and configuration layers and software testbench for design verification. Different crypto primitives (block ciphers, hash functions, checksum) were implemented along with basic countermeasures. Utilized methods of power consumption approximation are also described.Evaluation of capabilities of the entire environment prove that both, hardware architecture and testbench provide easily extensible and versatile framework for research and development of countermeasures against power-based side-channel attacks.
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