{"title":"共同价值伙伴关系的霰弹枪机制:未分配要约问题","authors":"Claudia M. Landeo, K. Spier","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2282204","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Shotgun clauses are commonly included in the business agreements of partnerships and limited liability companies (LLCs), but the role of offeror typically remains unassigned. In a common-value, one-sided asymmetric information setting, unequal and inefficient outcomes occur with an unassigned offeror. Experimental results are aligned with our theory.","PeriodicalId":145040,"journal":{"name":"Third-Party Intervention eJournal","volume":"116 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"14","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Shotgun Mechanisms for Common-Value Partnerships: The Unassigned-Offeror Problem\",\"authors\":\"Claudia M. Landeo, K. Spier\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2282204\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Shotgun clauses are commonly included in the business agreements of partnerships and limited liability companies (LLCs), but the role of offeror typically remains unassigned. In a common-value, one-sided asymmetric information setting, unequal and inefficient outcomes occur with an unassigned offeror. Experimental results are aligned with our theory.\",\"PeriodicalId\":145040,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Third-Party Intervention eJournal\",\"volume\":\"116 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2013-09-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"14\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Third-Party Intervention eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2282204\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Third-Party Intervention eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2282204","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Shotgun Mechanisms for Common-Value Partnerships: The Unassigned-Offeror Problem
Shotgun clauses are commonly included in the business agreements of partnerships and limited liability companies (LLCs), but the role of offeror typically remains unassigned. In a common-value, one-sided asymmetric information setting, unequal and inefficient outcomes occur with an unassigned offeror. Experimental results are aligned with our theory.
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