VeriTrust:硬件信任验证

Jie Zhang, F. Yuan, Lingxiao Wei, Zelong Sun, Q. Xu
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引用次数: 209

摘要

攻击者利用硬件木马(Hardware trojan,简称ht)作为后门,破坏或增强受感染设备的正常运行,从而导致设备的功能改变、敏感信息泄露或拒绝服务攻击。为了解决这类威胁,本文提出了一种新的硬件信任验证技术,即VeriTrust,该技术便于检测在设计阶段插入的ht。根据观察,HT通常是由专用的触发输入激活的,而这些触发输入没有被验证测试用例敏化,VeriTrust通过检查验证角自动识别这些潜在的HT触发输入。VeriTrust与现有HT检测技术的关键区别在于,VeriTrust对HT的实现风格不敏感。实验结果表明,VeriTrust能够以适度的额外验证时间为代价检测本文评估的所有HT(基于文献中显示的各种HT设计方法构建),这是现有解决方案无法实现的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
VeriTrust: Verification for hardware trust
Hardware Trojans (HTs) implemented by adversaries serve as backdoors to subvert or augment the normal operation of infected devices, which may lead to functionality changes, sensitive information leakages, or Denial of Service attacks. To tackle such threats, this paper proposes a novel verification technique for hardware trust, namely VeriTrust, which facilitates to detect HTs inserted at design stage. Based on the observation that HTs are usually activated by dedicated trigger inputs that are not sensitized with verification test cases, VeriTrust automatically identifies such potential HT trigger inputs by examining verification corners. The key difference between VeriTrust and existing HT detection techniques is that VeriTrust is insensitive to the implementation style of HTs. Experimental results show that VeriTrust is able to detect all HTs evaluated in this paper (constructed based on various HT design methodologies shown in the literature) at the cost of moderate extra verification time, which is not possible with existing solutions.
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