财政规则、财政委员会和所有这些:承诺工具、信号工具还是烟幕?

Xavier Debrun, Manmohan S. Kumar
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引用次数: 116

摘要

Xavier Debrun和Manmohan S. Kumar处理了制度对财政纪律的影响,首先从原则上讨论了这一点:(i)财政制度可以作为承诺工具(即束缚政策制定者的手);(ii)它们可以作为信号装置(即减少选民和决策者之间的信息不对称);(三)它们可能是烟幕。本文的第二部分发展了一个实证分析来检验这三个假设,参考描述性证据并估计了1990-2004年期间欧盟国家大样本的多变量面板模型。作者使用时变的财政规则限制和覆盖指数。分析发现,承诺和信号都得到了有力的支持,而烟幕假说几乎没有得到支持。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Fiscal Rules, Fiscal Councils and All that: Commitment Devices, Signaling Tools or Smokescreens?
Xavier Debrun and Manmohan S. Kumar deal with the impact of institutions on fiscal discipline, first discussing the point in principle: (i) fiscal institutions can work as commitment devices (i.e. tie policymakers’ hands); (ii) they can work as signalling devices (i.e. reduce the information asymmetry between the electorate and policymakers); and (iii) they can be smokescreens. The second part of the paper develops an empirical analysis to test these three hypotheses, referring to descriptive evidence and estimating a multivariate panel model for a large sample of EU countries over the period 1990-2004. The authors use time-varying indices of fiscal rule restrictiveness and coverage. The analysis finds significant support for both commitment and signalling, little for the smokescreen hypothesis.
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