{"title":"道德素食主义与心灵哲学","authors":"C. Oswald","doi":"10.33043/S.9.1.67-72","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Most arguments for moral vegetarianism rely on thepremise that non-human animals can suffer. In this paper I evaluateproblems that arise from Peter Carruthers’ Higher-Order Thoughttheory of consciousness. I argue that, even if we assume that theseproblems cannot be overcome, it does not follow that we should notsubscribe to moral vegetarianism. I conclude that we should act as ifnon-human animals have subjective experiences for moral reasons,even if we cannot be certain that they do.","PeriodicalId":375047,"journal":{"name":"Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Moral Vegetarianism and the Philosophy of Mind\",\"authors\":\"C. Oswald\",\"doi\":\"10.33043/S.9.1.67-72\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Most arguments for moral vegetarianism rely on thepremise that non-human animals can suffer. In this paper I evaluateproblems that arise from Peter Carruthers’ Higher-Order Thoughttheory of consciousness. I argue that, even if we assume that theseproblems cannot be overcome, it does not follow that we should notsubscribe to moral vegetarianism. I conclude that we should act as ifnon-human animals have subjective experiences for moral reasons,even if we cannot be certain that they do.\",\"PeriodicalId\":375047,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal\",\"volume\":\"23 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-09-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.33043/S.9.1.67-72\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.33043/S.9.1.67-72","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Most arguments for moral vegetarianism rely on thepremise that non-human animals can suffer. In this paper I evaluateproblems that arise from Peter Carruthers’ Higher-Order Thoughttheory of consciousness. I argue that, even if we assume that theseproblems cannot be overcome, it does not follow that we should notsubscribe to moral vegetarianism. I conclude that we should act as ifnon-human animals have subjective experiences for moral reasons,even if we cannot be certain that they do.
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