{"title":"统一保护隐私","authors":"M. Khodaei, Hamid Noroozi, Panos Papadimitratos","doi":"10.1145/3212480.3226101","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Inter-vehicle communications disclose rich information about vehicle whereabouts. Pseudonymous authentication secures communication while enhancing user privacy thanks to a set of anonymized certificates, termed pseudonyms. Vehicles switch the pseudonyms (and the corresponding private key) frequently; we term this pseudonym transition process. However, exactly because vehicles can in principle change their pseudonyms asynchronously, an adversary that eavesdrops (pseudonymously) signed messages, could link pseudonyms based on the times of pseudonym transition processes. In this poster, we show how one can link pseudonyms of a given vehicle by simply looking at the timing information of pseudonym transition processes. We also propose \"mix-zone everywhere\": time-aligned pseudonyms are issued for all vehicles to facilitate synchronous pseudonym update; as a result, all vehicles update their pseudonyms simultaneously, thus achieving higher user privacy protection.","PeriodicalId":267134,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks","volume":"13 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Privacy Preservation through Uniformity\",\"authors\":\"M. Khodaei, Hamid Noroozi, Panos Papadimitratos\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/3212480.3226101\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Inter-vehicle communications disclose rich information about vehicle whereabouts. Pseudonymous authentication secures communication while enhancing user privacy thanks to a set of anonymized certificates, termed pseudonyms. Vehicles switch the pseudonyms (and the corresponding private key) frequently; we term this pseudonym transition process. However, exactly because vehicles can in principle change their pseudonyms asynchronously, an adversary that eavesdrops (pseudonymously) signed messages, could link pseudonyms based on the times of pseudonym transition processes. In this poster, we show how one can link pseudonyms of a given vehicle by simply looking at the timing information of pseudonym transition processes. We also propose \\\"mix-zone everywhere\\\": time-aligned pseudonyms are issued for all vehicles to facilitate synchronous pseudonym update; as a result, all vehicles update their pseudonyms simultaneously, thus achieving higher user privacy protection.\",\"PeriodicalId\":267134,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks\",\"volume\":\"13 1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-06-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"4\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3212480.3226101\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3212480.3226101","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Inter-vehicle communications disclose rich information about vehicle whereabouts. Pseudonymous authentication secures communication while enhancing user privacy thanks to a set of anonymized certificates, termed pseudonyms. Vehicles switch the pseudonyms (and the corresponding private key) frequently; we term this pseudonym transition process. However, exactly because vehicles can in principle change their pseudonyms asynchronously, an adversary that eavesdrops (pseudonymously) signed messages, could link pseudonyms based on the times of pseudonym transition processes. In this poster, we show how one can link pseudonyms of a given vehicle by simply looking at the timing information of pseudonym transition processes. We also propose "mix-zone everywhere": time-aligned pseudonyms are issued for all vehicles to facilitate synchronous pseudonym update; as a result, all vehicles update their pseudonyms simultaneously, thus achieving higher user privacy protection.