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引用次数: 3
摘要
本文以Rosen(1981)和Hvide(2002)为基础，提供了一个简单的框架，阐明了高管之间在外部管理劳动力市场上争夺其他公司高管职位和在高管自己公司内部争夺内部高管职位的激励性质。在此过程中，该模型为Kale Reis和Venkataswaran (2009)， Kini和Williams(2012)以及Coles, Li和Wang(2018, 2017)的经验证据提供了正式基础，并暗示了共同基金经理之间比赛激励的性质(Brown, Harlow, and Starks, 1996)。
This paper builds on Rosen (1981) and Hvide (2002) to provide a simple framework that elucidates the nature of incentives in the tournaments among top executives in both the external managerial labor market for the top executive positions in other companies and within the executives’ own firm for the top internal position. In doing so, the model provides a formal foundation for the empirical evidence in Kale Reis, and Venkataswaran (2009), Kini and Williams (2012), and Coles, Li, and Wang (2018, 2017) and is suggestive of the nature of tournament incentives among mutual fund managers (Brown, Harlow, and Starks, 1996).
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