Book Review.

Felix Mühlhölzer’s book Wissenschaft (‘‘Science’’) appeared in the series ‘‘Grundwissen Philosophie’’ (‘‘Basic Knowledge in Philosophy’’), whose aim is to give an introduction to different philosophical topics. Thus, Mühlhölzer’s Wissenschaft can be read with profit by beginners, while not providing a straightforward introduction to the subject. Rather, the author puts forward an argumentation of his own, and in so doing, chooses to ignore some essential questions and problems of the Philosophy of Science. Therefore my review will not discuss the didactic qualities of the book, but concentrate on the author’s argumentation. In seven chapters, he presents ‘‘some thoughts’’ (10) concerning the central issues of science and scientific objectivity. The author’s argumentation rests, I think, on four main aspects: normativity, the concept of scientific man (wissenschaftlicher Mensch), that of lifeworld (Lebenswelt) and finally Kuhn’s Philosophy of Science. The first chapter (‘‘Philosophy of Science’’, 14–18) sets the course for an elucidation of the practice of philosophers of science. As Mühlhölzer puts it: ‘‘Simple prudence suggests that Philosophy of Science respects scientific practice and remains, as far as possible, descriptive, i. e., tries to illuminate sciences—and in particular their normative practices— descriptively.’’ (16, my emphasis). What is meant by ‘‘simple prudence’’ is (at this point) not clear. I shall come back to this point in my discussion of Mühlhölzer’s view. In the second chapter (‘‘The Concept of Science’’, 19–29) Mühlhölzer draws on Herman Weyl’s characterization of the role that objectivity plays in science. Here, the author says nothing about the concept, except that he considers it more important for a description of scientific practice than the concept of truth. Subsequently, Mühlhölzer points to the