捆绑和质量保证

James D Dana, K. Spier
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引用次数: 10

摘要

我们考虑了在不完善的私人监督下销售体验商品的多产品公司产品质量选择的重复道德风险模型。当消费者接收到不完美的产品质量私人信号时,消费来自同一家公司的两种产品可以改善监控。消费者的监控对其他消费者具有正外部性,但消费者在做出购买决策时忽略了这一点。产品捆绑通过约束消费者购买两种商品和更有效地监控来提高产品质量。如果(1)消费者只能将负面信号归因于一对互补产品,而不能归因于特定产品,以及(2)如果两种商品中的一种是耐用的,另一种是互补的非耐用的,那么捆绑销售的社会和私人价值甚至更大。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Bundling and Quality Assurance
We consider a repeated moral hazard model of product quality choice by a multiproduct firm selling experience goods with imperfect private monitoring. When consumers receive imperfect private signals of product quality, consuming two products from the same firm improves monitoring. Monitoring by consumers has a positive externality on other consumers, but consumers ignore this when making their purchase decisions. Product bundling improves product quality by constraining consumers to purchase both goods and monitor more effectively. The social and private value of bundling is even larger if (1) consumers can only attribute a negative signal to a pair of complementary products and not to a specific product, and (2) if one of the two goods is a durable and the other is a complementary nondurable.
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