排他性市场的销售:关于无先验机制设计的一些观察

Anna R. Karlin, C. T. Nguyen, Y. Peres
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引用次数: 1

摘要

我们在非矩阵设置中考虑无先验基准。特别是,我们证明了Hartline和Roughgarden提出的一个非常理想的基准过于强大,从某种意义上说,没有任何真实的机制可以与它竞争,即使在一个非常简单的非矩阵设置中,有两个独家市场,卖家只能向其中一个的代理商销售。另一方面,我们展示了与此基准的对称版本竞争的机制。我们进一步研究了更传统的最佳固定价格利润基准,并表明在任何向下封闭的设置中都存在与之竞争的机制。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Selling in Exclusive Markets: Some Observations on Prior-Free Mechanism Design
We consider prior-free benchmarks in non-matroid settings. In particular, we show that a very desirable benchmark proposed by Hartline and Roughgarden is too strong, in the sense that no truthful mechanism can compete with it even in a very simple non-matroid setting where there are two exclusive markets and the seller can only sell to agents in one of them. On the other hand, we show that there is a mechanism that competes with a symmetrized version of this benchmark. We further investigate the more traditional best fixed price profit benchmark and show that there are mechanisms that compete with it in any downward-closed settings.
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