{"title":"排他性市场的销售:关于无先验机制设计的一些观察","authors":"Anna R. Karlin, C. T. Nguyen, Y. Peres","doi":"10.1145/2465769.2465772","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We consider prior-free benchmarks in non-matroid settings. In particular, we show that a very desirable benchmark proposed by Hartline and Roughgarden is too strong, in the sense that no truthful mechanism can compete with it even in a very simple non-matroid setting where there are two exclusive markets and the seller can only sell to agents in one of them. On the other hand, we show that there is a mechanism that competes with a symmetrized version of this benchmark. We further investigate the more traditional best fixed price profit benchmark and show that there are mechanisms that compete with it in any downward-closed settings.","PeriodicalId":194623,"journal":{"name":"ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.","volume":"229 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Selling in Exclusive Markets: Some Observations on Prior-Free Mechanism Design\",\"authors\":\"Anna R. Karlin, C. T. Nguyen, Y. Peres\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/2465769.2465772\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We consider prior-free benchmarks in non-matroid settings. In particular, we show that a very desirable benchmark proposed by Hartline and Roughgarden is too strong, in the sense that no truthful mechanism can compete with it even in a very simple non-matroid setting where there are two exclusive markets and the seller can only sell to agents in one of them. On the other hand, we show that there is a mechanism that competes with a symmetrized version of this benchmark. We further investigate the more traditional best fixed price profit benchmark and show that there are mechanisms that compete with it in any downward-closed settings.\",\"PeriodicalId\":194623,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.\",\"volume\":\"229 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2013-05-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2465769.2465772\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2465769.2465772","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Selling in Exclusive Markets: Some Observations on Prior-Free Mechanism Design
We consider prior-free benchmarks in non-matroid settings. In particular, we show that a very desirable benchmark proposed by Hartline and Roughgarden is too strong, in the sense that no truthful mechanism can compete with it even in a very simple non-matroid setting where there are two exclusive markets and the seller can only sell to agents in one of them. On the other hand, we show that there is a mechanism that competes with a symmetrized version of this benchmark. We further investigate the more traditional best fixed price profit benchmark and show that there are mechanisms that compete with it in any downward-closed settings.