监管中的市场纪律

M. Flannery, R. Bliss
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引用次数: 2

摘要

随着2004年巴塞尔协议II的出台,“市场纪律”成为巴塞尔委员会审慎监管的三大支柱之一。尽管许多学术论文试图测试银行业是否存在有效的市场纪律,但很少有论文全面探讨了这个问题。有效的市场纪律包括两个不同的步骤:监测银行的状况,并对其施加影响,以避免不可接受的巨大风险。市场纪律的两个阶段都是必要的;两者单独都不够。在本章中,我们提供了市场纪律的仔细定义,解释了它如何补充监管努力以控制机构的冒险行为,并回顾了有关市场纪律有效性的现有文献。我们还讨论了最近对破产银行的监管行动的变化如何改变了市场纪律向前发展的渠道。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Market Discipline in Regulation
With the introduction of Basel II in 2004, “market discipline” became one of the Basel Committee’s three pillars of prudential regulation. Although many academic papers have sought to test for the presence of effective market discipline in banking, few have dealt fully with the question. Effective market discipline involves two distinct steps: monitoring a bank’s condition and influencing it to avoid unacceptably large risks. Both phases of market discipline are necessary; neither one alone sufficient. In this chapter, we provide a careful definition of market discipline, explain how it may complement supervisory efforts to control an institution’s risk-taking, and review the available literature on the efficacy of market discipline. We also discuss how recent changes in supervisory actions toward failing banks has changed the channels through which market discipline will work going forward.
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