{"title":"股票授予作为一种承诺手段","authors":"Gian Luca Clementi, Thomas F. Cooley, Cheng Wang","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.329629","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"A large and increasing fraction of the value of executives' compensation is accounted for by security grants. However, in most models of executive compensation, the optimal allocation can be implemented through a sequence of state-contingent cash payments. Security awards are redundant. In this paper we develop a dynamic model of managerial compensation where neither the firm nor the manager can commit to long-term contracts. We show that, in this environment, if stock grants are not used, then the optimal contract collapses to a series of short term contracts. When stock grants are used, however, nonlinear intertemporal schemes can be implemented to achieve better risk-sharing and higher firm value.","PeriodicalId":124312,"journal":{"name":"New York University Stern School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2003-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"21","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Stock Grants as a Commitment Device\",\"authors\":\"Gian Luca Clementi, Thomas F. Cooley, Cheng Wang\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.329629\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"A large and increasing fraction of the value of executives' compensation is accounted for by security grants. However, in most models of executive compensation, the optimal allocation can be implemented through a sequence of state-contingent cash payments. Security awards are redundant. In this paper we develop a dynamic model of managerial compensation where neither the firm nor the manager can commit to long-term contracts. We show that, in this environment, if stock grants are not used, then the optimal contract collapses to a series of short term contracts. When stock grants are used, however, nonlinear intertemporal schemes can be implemented to achieve better risk-sharing and higher firm value.\",\"PeriodicalId\":124312,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"New York University Stern School of Business Research Paper Series\",\"volume\":\"19 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2003-03-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"21\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"New York University Stern School of Business Research Paper Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.329629\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"New York University Stern School of Business Research Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.329629","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
A large and increasing fraction of the value of executives' compensation is accounted for by security grants. However, in most models of executive compensation, the optimal allocation can be implemented through a sequence of state-contingent cash payments. Security awards are redundant. In this paper we develop a dynamic model of managerial compensation where neither the firm nor the manager can commit to long-term contracts. We show that, in this environment, if stock grants are not used, then the optimal contract collapses to a series of short term contracts. When stock grants are used, however, nonlinear intertemporal schemes can be implemented to achieve better risk-sharing and higher firm value.