{"title":"信息不对称条件下服务合作双渠道供应链的定价决策","authors":"G. Ji, Muhong Yu","doi":"10.1109/ICSSSM.2014.6943409","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes a dual channel supply chain with service cooperation under asymmetric information. We consider the games with asymmetric risk information and symmetric information respectively, derive the corresponding equilibrium strategies, and conduct detailed comparisons and analyses. We study the impact of service quality and asymmetric information on the optimal strategies. We find that the impact of manufacturer's service quality on direct channel price is greater than its on retail price, and retailer's service quality has a greater impact on retail price under with asymmetric information. Retailer would like to share his private information with manufacturer in order to get more profits.","PeriodicalId":206364,"journal":{"name":"2014 11th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management (ICSSSM)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Pricing decisions in dual-channel supply chains with service cooperation under asymmetric information\",\"authors\":\"G. Ji, Muhong Yu\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/ICSSSM.2014.6943409\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper analyzes a dual channel supply chain with service cooperation under asymmetric information. We consider the games with asymmetric risk information and symmetric information respectively, derive the corresponding equilibrium strategies, and conduct detailed comparisons and analyses. We study the impact of service quality and asymmetric information on the optimal strategies. We find that the impact of manufacturer's service quality on direct channel price is greater than its on retail price, and retailer's service quality has a greater impact on retail price under with asymmetric information. Retailer would like to share his private information with manufacturer in order to get more profits.\",\"PeriodicalId\":206364,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2014 11th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management (ICSSSM)\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-06-25\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2014 11th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management (ICSSSM)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICSSSM.2014.6943409\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2014 11th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management (ICSSSM)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICSSSM.2014.6943409","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Pricing decisions in dual-channel supply chains with service cooperation under asymmetric information
This paper analyzes a dual channel supply chain with service cooperation under asymmetric information. We consider the games with asymmetric risk information and symmetric information respectively, derive the corresponding equilibrium strategies, and conduct detailed comparisons and analyses. We study the impact of service quality and asymmetric information on the optimal strategies. We find that the impact of manufacturer's service quality on direct channel price is greater than its on retail price, and retailer's service quality has a greater impact on retail price under with asymmetric information. Retailer would like to share his private information with manufacturer in order to get more profits.