{"title":"通过忽略最大的错误来学习","authors":"S. Bradley","doi":"10.1515/krt-2021-0028","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Imprecise probabilities (IP) are an increasingly popular way of reasoning about rational credence. However they are subject to an apparent failure to display convincing inductive learning. This paper demonstrates that a small modification to the update rule for IP allows us to overcome this problem, albeit at the cost of satisfying only a weaker concept of coherence.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Learning by Ignoring the Most Wrong\",\"authors\":\"S. Bradley\",\"doi\":\"10.1515/krt-2021-0028\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract Imprecise probabilities (IP) are an increasingly popular way of reasoning about rational credence. However they are subject to an apparent failure to display convincing inductive learning. This paper demonstrates that a small modification to the update rule for IP allows us to overcome this problem, albeit at the cost of satisfying only a weaker concept of coherence.\",\"PeriodicalId\":107351,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy\",\"volume\":\"24 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-12-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"4\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2021-0028\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2021-0028","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Imprecise probabilities (IP) are an increasingly popular way of reasoning about rational credence. However they are subject to an apparent failure to display convincing inductive learning. This paper demonstrates that a small modification to the update rule for IP allows us to overcome this problem, albeit at the cost of satisfying only a weaker concept of coherence.
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