{"title":"思想是一个自我驱动的主体。重新审视马克思和黑格尔之间的联系","authors":"Rodrigo Steimberg","doi":"10.15304/AG.40.2.6732","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The approach introduced in this paper bases on Marx´s criticism of Hegel in order to explain which determinations of capitalism allow Hegel to describe the general forms of the dialectical method. We affirm that, since capital has an automatic movement, Hegel supposes that the conscience, which realizes this movement, sets itself in motion. Nevertheless, following Marx we argue that Hegel clarifies the basic structure of the dialectical method, i. e., the affirmation through self-negation of every real form.","PeriodicalId":353116,"journal":{"name":"Ágora","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"El pensamiento como sujeto automomizado. Revisitando el vínculo entre Marx y Hegel\",\"authors\":\"Rodrigo Steimberg\",\"doi\":\"10.15304/AG.40.2.6732\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The approach introduced in this paper bases on Marx´s criticism of Hegel in order to explain which determinations of capitalism allow Hegel to describe the general forms of the dialectical method. We affirm that, since capital has an automatic movement, Hegel supposes that the conscience, which realizes this movement, sets itself in motion. Nevertheless, following Marx we argue that Hegel clarifies the basic structure of the dialectical method, i. e., the affirmation through self-negation of every real form.\",\"PeriodicalId\":353116,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Ágora\",\"volume\":\"40 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-05-11\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Ágora\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.15304/AG.40.2.6732\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Ágora","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.15304/AG.40.2.6732","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
El pensamiento como sujeto automomizado. Revisitando el vínculo entre Marx y Hegel
The approach introduced in this paper bases on Marx´s criticism of Hegel in order to explain which determinations of capitalism allow Hegel to describe the general forms of the dialectical method. We affirm that, since capital has an automatic movement, Hegel supposes that the conscience, which realizes this movement, sets itself in motion. Nevertheless, following Marx we argue that Hegel clarifies the basic structure of the dialectical method, i. e., the affirmation through self-negation of every real form.