The Optimal Privatization Policies Under an International Mixed Duopoly

This paper explores the socially optimal privatization policies under the setting of international mixed duopoly. We find that partial privatization is socially optimal under Cournot competition and private leadership competition, whereas full nationalization is socially optimal under public leadership competition. Moreover, the equilibrium social welfare under private leadership competition is higher than that observed under Cournot competition and that observed under private leadership competition, which differs from the findings of Matsumura ([Matsumura, Toshihiro, 2003b]). We also show that the endogenous timing game has a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome, under which the government chooses a partial privatization policy, and private leadership competition emerges as the optimal output decision sequence of firms. An important policy implication from this paper is that the government should partially privatize the public firm and facilitate the emergence of private leadership competition in an international mixed market.