根据英国电信部对液态天然气调查…的调查和反垄断调查中的证据调查

Enno Ahlenstiel
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摘要

2018年10月9日,德国联邦法院(FCJ)撤销了德国塞尔多夫上诉法院(DCA)的决定,该决定大幅提高了德国联邦卡特尔办公室对所谓的液化石油气(LPG)卡特尔成员的罚款。FCJ发现DCA对罚款的计算存在缺陷,并将案件提交给DCA,为如何正确评估罚款的依据提供指导。尽管联邦司法委员会的决定涉及德国竞争法的旧版本,该版本规定对卡特尔的罚款必须与因侵权而获得的额外收入相称(kartellbedingter Mehrerlös),但该决定将对与违反竞争法相关的其他诉讼产生重大影响,其中滥用主导地位(例如滥用定价)被调查以及卡特尔损害索赔。公平司法委员会在其决定中规定的原则很可能与确定在此类情况下获得的额外收入有关。例如,联邦司法委员会驳回了DCA的内部市场价格比较,并严厉批评了DCA如何处理被告提出的论点。此外,联邦司法委员会指出,可能有必要让经济专家来确定通过侵权获得的额外收入。这篇文章更详细地解释了DCA是如何确定这些收入的,以及FCJ对DCA方法的批评。在涉及同一卡特尔的平行诉讼中,联邦司法委员会判定,如果子公司继续参与卡特尔而不是母公司,则法定继承人应承担侵权责任。联邦司法委员会还裁定,如果法院想要拒绝在事实复杂的卡特尔罚款诉讼中取证的申请,它不能只参考一项一般性声明,即取证是不必要的。相反,法院必须给出理由,说明为什么在目前的案件中没有必要进行调查。这当然是一个积极的发展,因为它将使企业在卡特尔罚款诉讼中更好地在法庭上为自己辩护。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Wettbewerbsökonomische Würdigung, Rechtsnachfolge und Beweiserhebung in Kartellverfahren nach den Urteilen des BGH in Sachen Flüssiggas
Competition economics, legal succession, and taking of evidence in light of the German Federal Court of Justice’s decisions concerning the liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cartel On 9 October 2018, the German Federal Court of Justice (FCJ) quashed the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal’s (DCA) decision that had increased the German Federal Cartel Office's fines on members of the socalled liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cartel significantly. The FCJ found that the DCA's calculation of the fines was flawed and referred the case back to the DCA – providing guidance on how to assess the basis for the fines correctly. Despite the fact that the FCJ's decision concerned an old version of German competition law which provided that fines for a cartel must be commensurate to the additional revenues gained due to the infringement (kartellbedingter Mehrerlös), this decision will have significant implications for other proceedings related to infringements of competition law, where an abuse of a dominant position (e. g. abuse of pricing) is investigated as well as in cartel damage claims. The principles set out by the FCJ in its decision will most likely be relevant for determining the additional revenues gained in such cases. For example, the FCJ rejected the DCA's intra-market price comparison and heavily criticized how the DCA had dealt with the arguments put forward by the defendants. Furthermore, the FCJ indicated that it might be necessary to involve economic experts to determine the additional revenues gained through an infringement. The article explains in more detail how the DCA had determined these revenues as well as the FCJ's criticism of the DCA's methodology. In parallel proceedings concerning the same cartel the FCJ held a legal successor liable for the infringement where a subsidiary had continued to participate in a cartel instead of the parent company. The FCJ also ruled that if a court wants to reject an application to take evidence in factually complex cartel fine proceedings, it cannot refer only to a general statement that taking of evidence was unnecessary. Instead, the court must give reasons why an investigation was not necessary in the case at hand. This is certainly a positive development as it will allow companies to better defend themselves in court in cartel fine proceedings.
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