竞争情景下自动驾驶汽车的博弈规划

Mingyu Wang, Zijian Wang, J. Talbot, J. C. Gerdes, M. Schwager
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引用次数: 51

摘要

针对自动驾驶汽车与其他汽车竞争的情况,提出了一种非线性后退视界博弈论规划方法。在线计划器是专门为两辆车的自动赛车游戏设计的,在这款游戏中,每辆车都试图在给定的赛道上相对于另一辆车尽可能地前进。该算法通过以下方式扩展了先前针对单个积分器代理的博弈论规划工作,使其适用于自动驾驶汽车:(i)将轨迹表示为分段多项式,(ii)将自行车运动学纳入轨迹,(iii)对路径曲率和加速度施加约束。博弈论规划者迭代地为自我飞行器规划一个轨迹,然后是另一个飞行器,直到收敛。至关重要的是,轨迹优化包括一个灵敏度项,允许自我车辆推断出其他车辆将向自我车辆让步多少以避免碰撞。由此产生的自我车辆的轨迹表现出丰富的游戏策略,如阻塞、伪造和机会超车。结果表明,采用模型预测控制的博弈论规划器的性能明显优于不考虑交互的基线规划器。在高保真数值模拟、两辆规模自动驾驶汽车的实验以及一辆全尺寸自动驾驶汽车与模拟车辆的比赛实验中,验证了该性能。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Game Theoretic Planning for Self-Driving Cars in Competitive Scenarios
We propose a nonlinear receding horizon gametheoretic planner for autonomous cars in competitive scenarios with other cars. The online planner is specifically formulated for a two car autonomous racing game in which each car tries to advance along a given track as far as possible with respect to the other car. The algorithm extends previous work on gametheoretic planning for single integrator agents to be suitable for autonomous cars in the following ways: (i) by representing the trajectory as a piecewise-polynomial, (ii) incorporating bicycle kinematics into the trajectory, (iii) enforcing constraints on path curvature and acceleration. The game theoretic planner iteratively plans a trajectory for the ego vehicle, then the other vehicle until convergence. Crucially, the trajectory optimization includes a sensitivity term that allows the ego vehicle to reason about how much the other vehicle will yield to the ego vehicle to avoid collisions. The resulting trajectories for the ego vehicle exhibit rich game strategies such as blocking, faking, and opportunistic overtaking. The game-theoretic planner is shown to significantly out-perform a baseline planner using Model Predictive Control which does not take interaction into account. The performance is validated in high-fidelity numerical simulations, in experiments with two scale autonomous cars, and in experiments with a fullscale autonomous car racing against a simulated vehicle.
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