{"title":"社会福利、父母利他主义与不平等","authors":"P. Reichlin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3230020","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"I discuss two alternative notions of social welfare (utilitarian and self- enforcing) in a dynastic model with heterogeneous and persistent degrees of parental altruism and evaluate the implied levels of consumption inequality. Then, I study a decentralization of planning optima in a competitive equilibrium where the only source of inequality arises from intergenerational wealth transmission and I show that the self-enforcing criterion implies a negative tax rate on the less altruistic individuals’ capital income.","PeriodicalId":398942,"journal":{"name":"Social Sciences eJournal","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Social Welfare, Parental Altruism and Inequality\",\"authors\":\"P. Reichlin\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3230020\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"I discuss two alternative notions of social welfare (utilitarian and self- enforcing) in a dynastic model with heterogeneous and persistent degrees of parental altruism and evaluate the implied levels of consumption inequality. Then, I study a decentralization of planning optima in a competitive equilibrium where the only source of inequality arises from intergenerational wealth transmission and I show that the self-enforcing criterion implies a negative tax rate on the less altruistic individuals’ capital income.\",\"PeriodicalId\":398942,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Social Sciences eJournal\",\"volume\":\"50 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-08-13\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Social Sciences eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3230020\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Social Sciences eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3230020","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
I discuss two alternative notions of social welfare (utilitarian and self- enforcing) in a dynastic model with heterogeneous and persistent degrees of parental altruism and evaluate the implied levels of consumption inequality. Then, I study a decentralization of planning optima in a competitive equilibrium where the only source of inequality arises from intergenerational wealth transmission and I show that the self-enforcing criterion implies a negative tax rate on the less altruistic individuals’ capital income.