社会福利、父母利他主义与不平等

P. Reichlin
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我讨论了社会福利的两种替代概念(功利主义和自我执行)在一个具有异质性和持续程度的父母利他主义的动态模型中,并评估了隐含的消费不平等水平。然后,我研究了竞争均衡中规划最优的分散化,其中不平等的唯一来源来自代际财富传递,我证明了自我执行标准意味着对利他主义程度较低的个人的资本收入征收负税率。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Social Welfare, Parental Altruism and Inequality
I discuss two alternative notions of social welfare (utilitarian and self- enforcing) in a dynastic model with heterogeneous and persistent degrees of parental altruism and evaluate the implied levels of consumption inequality. Then, I study a decentralization of planning optima in a competitive equilibrium where the only source of inequality arises from intergenerational wealth transmission and I show that the self-enforcing criterion implies a negative tax rate on the less altruistic individuals’ capital income.
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