{"title":"我的纤维还是你的纤维?合作投资、不确定性和准入","authors":"M. Bourreau, C. Cambini, Steffen Hoernig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2199831","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We investigate cooperative investment in a new infrastructure and how it interacts with access obligations and demand uncertainty. Co-investment only increases total coverage if service differentiation and/or cost savings from joint investment, in particular due to high uncertainty, are high. Mandated access reduces incentives for co-investment not only through lower returns but also by creating the option to ask for access instead. Voluntary access provision increases infrastructure coverage but reduces social welfare by softening competition.","PeriodicalId":300963,"journal":{"name":"Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) Research Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"10","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"My Fibre or Your Fibre? Cooperative Investment, Uncertainty and Access\",\"authors\":\"M. Bourreau, C. Cambini, Steffen Hoernig\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2199831\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We investigate cooperative investment in a new infrastructure and how it interacts with access obligations and demand uncertainty. Co-investment only increases total coverage if service differentiation and/or cost savings from joint investment, in particular due to high uncertainty, are high. Mandated access reduces incentives for co-investment not only through lower returns but also by creating the option to ask for access instead. Voluntary access provision increases infrastructure coverage but reduces social welfare by softening competition.\",\"PeriodicalId\":300963,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) Research Paper Series\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2013-01-11\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"10\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) Research Paper Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2199831\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) Research Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2199831","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
My Fibre or Your Fibre? Cooperative Investment, Uncertainty and Access
We investigate cooperative investment in a new infrastructure and how it interacts with access obligations and demand uncertainty. Co-investment only increases total coverage if service differentiation and/or cost savings from joint investment, in particular due to high uncertainty, are high. Mandated access reduces incentives for co-investment not only through lower returns but also by creating the option to ask for access instead. Voluntary access provision increases infrastructure coverage but reduces social welfare by softening competition.