{"title":"有零件还是没有零件?","authors":"Anna Marmodoro","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197577158.003.0006","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter investigates the mereological complexity of the Forms, asking, not whether Forms have parts (which was a question examined in chapter 4), but whether and how each Form is constitutionally unified. If objects participate in Forms, overlapping constitutionally with them, how do the parts of a Form make up a single entity? Plato addresses this question by breaking new ground in metaphysics. In the Theaetetus Plato pioneers an account of how a composite may be derived from parts but be partless.","PeriodicalId":242364,"journal":{"name":"Forms and Structure in Plato's Metaphysics","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Parts, or no parts?\",\"authors\":\"Anna Marmodoro\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/oso/9780197577158.003.0006\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This chapter investigates the mereological complexity of the Forms, asking, not whether Forms have parts (which was a question examined in chapter 4), but whether and how each Form is constitutionally unified. If objects participate in Forms, overlapping constitutionally with them, how do the parts of a Form make up a single entity? Plato addresses this question by breaking new ground in metaphysics. In the Theaetetus Plato pioneers an account of how a composite may be derived from parts but be partless.\",\"PeriodicalId\":242364,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Forms and Structure in Plato's Metaphysics\",\"volume\":\"9 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-08-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Forms and Structure in Plato's Metaphysics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197577158.003.0006\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Forms and Structure in Plato's Metaphysics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197577158.003.0006","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter investigates the mereological complexity of the Forms, asking, not whether Forms have parts (which was a question examined in chapter 4), but whether and how each Form is constitutionally unified. If objects participate in Forms, overlapping constitutionally with them, how do the parts of a Form make up a single entity? Plato addresses this question by breaking new ground in metaphysics. In the Theaetetus Plato pioneers an account of how a composite may be derived from parts but be partless.