基于努力水平的双渠道供应链战略分析

G. Ji, Shangqing Han
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引用次数: 4

摘要

本文提出了一个分析框架来分析双渠道供应链中的两种情况:制造商处于主导地位,零售商处于主导地位。关注零售商的销售努力、制造商的在线销售努力和品牌努力,我们将这两种情况下的竞争决策建模为竞争制造商和零售商之间的两阶段顺序博弈。我们的分析表明,与在线销售努力相比,制造商总是需要更多的激励来采用品牌努力。如果制造商使用品牌努力,它的批发定价将会提高,而零售商将需要更多的销售努力。我们的研究结果还指出,当制造商采用品牌努力时,会提高产品的总市场价格。但是,当制造商处于劣势时,对产品定价的影响就会减小。从市场需求的角度来看,我们发现制造商和零售商的偏好完全相反。制造商总是有更多的动机使用在线销售努力,而零售商更倾向于制造商采用品牌努力。此外,我们还发现当制造商处于优势地位时,其战略选择对市场总需求的影响会降低。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A strategy analysis in dual-channel supply chain based on effort levels
We present an analytical framework to analyze two scenarios in dual-channel supply chain: manufacturer in a dominant position, retailer in a dominant position. Focusing on retailer's sales effort, manufacturer's online sales effort and brand effort, we model competitive decision making in both scenarios as two-stage sequential games between competing manufacturer and retailer. Our analysis indicates that compared with online sales effort, manufacturer always needs more incentive to adopt brand effort. And if manufacturer uses brand effort, its wholesale pricing will be enhanced, while the retailer will need more sales effort. Our results also point out when manufacturer adopts brand effort will enhance the total market products pricing. But, when the manufacturer is at a disadvantage, the impact on the products pricing will be reduced. From the viewpoint of market demand, we find that manufacturer and retailer's preference is completely opposite. Manufacturer always has more incentive to use online sales effort, while retailer prefers manufacturer to adopt brand effort. Furthermore, we also find when manufacturer in dominant position, the impact of its strategy choices on the total market demand will be decreased.
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