后社会主义国家的中央银行独立性、通货膨胀和社会分化

Victor Koziuk
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引用次数: 2

摘要

后危机时期的文献关注的是低通胀经济环境问题,传统的宏观经济不稳定因素对这一问题并不重要。然而,这种方法是否适合后社会主义国家的情况下,欧元一体化的有效性划分的制度发展道路发生?社会派系化的事实能否解释央行独立性与通胀之间反向相关性的传统形式的偏离?利用22个后社会主义国家的样本,我们发现央行独立性与通货膨胀之间存在逆(传统)关系。在通货膨胀率较低的情况下,这种相关性的程度不会降低太多。民主的发展支持央行提高独立性的选择。社会冲突的程度影响通货膨胀的不稳定性,同时也减少了就增加央行独立性达成共识的空间。与此同时,与平均群体水平(乌克兰的情况)相比,较高的中央银行独立性和较高的通货膨胀水平对应于最强的社会分馏化。这有助于得出这样的结论:央行独立性建立在非正式的政治行为规则的基础上,维持这些规则的动机根植于社会不和谐的本质。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
INDEPENDENCE OF CENTRAL BANKS, INFLATION AND FRACTIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY IN POST-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
Post-crisis literature concentrates on the problem of low inflation economic environment for which traditional factors of macroeconomic instability are rather not important. However, is this approach adequate in the case of post-socialist countries for whom the validity of euro-integration divide of institutional path of development takes place? Can the fact of factionalized societies explain the deviations from traditional form of opposite correlation between central banks independence and inflation? Using a sample of 22 post-socialist countries, it is found that there is inverse (traditional) relation between central bank independence and inflation. The degree of such correlation does not decrease much in the case of a lower inflation period. Development of democracy supports the choice toward higher central banks independence. The level of social conflicts affects inflationary instability and in the same time reduces space for consensus about increasing central banks independence. At the same time, the case of higher central bank independence and higher level of inflation compared to average group level (case of Ukraine) corresponds to the strongest fractionalization of society. This helps to conclude that institute of central bank independence is based on informal political rules of behaviour, incentives to maintain which are rooted in the nature of social disharmony.
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