{"title":"Tap 'n Ghost:针对智能手机触摸屏的新攻击技术汇编","authors":"S. Maruyama, Satohiro Wakabayashi, Tatsuya Mori","doi":"10.1109/SP.2019.00037","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We present a novel attack named \"Tap 'n Ghost\", which aims to attack the touchscreens of NFC-enabled mobile devices such as smartphones. Tap 'n Ghost consists of two striking attack techniques --- \"Tag-based Adaptive Ploy (TAP)\" and \"Ghost Touch Generator.\" First, using a NFC card emulator embedded in a common object such as table, a TAP system performs tailored attacks on the victim's smartphone by employing device fingerprinting; e.g., popping up a customized dialogue box asking whether or not to connect to an attacker's Bluetooth mouse. Further, Ghost Touch Generator forces the victim to connect to the mouse even if she or he aimed to cancel the dialogue by touching the \"cancel\" button; i.e., it alters the selection of a button on a screen. After the connection is established, the attacker can remotely take control of the smartphone, with the knowledge about the layout of the screen derived from the device fingerprinting. To evaluate the reality of the attack, we perform an online survey with 300 respondents and a user study involving 16 participants. The results demonstrate that the attack is realistic. We additionally discuss the possible countermeasures against the threats posed by Tap 'n Ghost.","PeriodicalId":272713,"journal":{"name":"2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"22","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Tap 'n Ghost: A Compilation of Novel Attack Techniques against Smartphone Touchscreens\",\"authors\":\"S. Maruyama, Satohiro Wakabayashi, Tatsuya Mori\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/SP.2019.00037\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We present a novel attack named \\\"Tap 'n Ghost\\\", which aims to attack the touchscreens of NFC-enabled mobile devices such as smartphones. Tap 'n Ghost consists of two striking attack techniques --- \\\"Tag-based Adaptive Ploy (TAP)\\\" and \\\"Ghost Touch Generator.\\\" First, using a NFC card emulator embedded in a common object such as table, a TAP system performs tailored attacks on the victim's smartphone by employing device fingerprinting; e.g., popping up a customized dialogue box asking whether or not to connect to an attacker's Bluetooth mouse. Further, Ghost Touch Generator forces the victim to connect to the mouse even if she or he aimed to cancel the dialogue by touching the \\\"cancel\\\" button; i.e., it alters the selection of a button on a screen. After the connection is established, the attacker can remotely take control of the smartphone, with the knowledge about the layout of the screen derived from the device fingerprinting. To evaluate the reality of the attack, we perform an online survey with 300 respondents and a user study involving 16 participants. The results demonstrate that the attack is realistic. We additionally discuss the possible countermeasures against the threats posed by Tap 'n Ghost.\",\"PeriodicalId\":272713,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)\",\"volume\":\"34 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-05-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"22\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2019.00037\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2019.00037","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 22
摘要
我们提出了一种名为“Tap 'n Ghost”的新型攻击,旨在攻击支持nfc的移动设备(如智能手机)的触摸屏。Tap 'n Ghost包括两种引人注目的攻击技术——“基于标签的自适应策略(Tap)”和“鬼触发生器”。首先,使用嵌入在普通物体(如桌子)中的NFC卡模拟器,TAP系统通过使用设备指纹对受害者的智能手机执行定制攻击;例如,弹出一个定制的对话框,询问是否连接到攻击者的蓝牙鼠标。此外,《Ghost Touch Generator》强迫受害者连接鼠标,即使她或他想通过触碰“取消”按钮来取消对话;也就是说,它改变了屏幕上按钮的选择。连接建立后,攻击者可以远程控制智能手机,通过设备指纹获取屏幕布局信息。为了评估攻击的真实性,我们对300名受访者进行了在线调查,并对16名参与者进行了用户研究。结果表明,该攻击是可行的。我们还讨论了针对Tap 'n Ghost所构成威胁的可能对策。
Tap 'n Ghost: A Compilation of Novel Attack Techniques against Smartphone Touchscreens
We present a novel attack named "Tap 'n Ghost", which aims to attack the touchscreens of NFC-enabled mobile devices such as smartphones. Tap 'n Ghost consists of two striking attack techniques --- "Tag-based Adaptive Ploy (TAP)" and "Ghost Touch Generator." First, using a NFC card emulator embedded in a common object such as table, a TAP system performs tailored attacks on the victim's smartphone by employing device fingerprinting; e.g., popping up a customized dialogue box asking whether or not to connect to an attacker's Bluetooth mouse. Further, Ghost Touch Generator forces the victim to connect to the mouse even if she or he aimed to cancel the dialogue by touching the "cancel" button; i.e., it alters the selection of a button on a screen. After the connection is established, the attacker can remotely take control of the smartphone, with the knowledge about the layout of the screen derived from the device fingerprinting. To evaluate the reality of the attack, we perform an online survey with 300 respondents and a user study involving 16 participants. The results demonstrate that the attack is realistic. We additionally discuss the possible countermeasures against the threats posed by Tap 'n Ghost.