{"title":"等同原则保护后生技术字面侵权范围的修正","authors":"Joshua D. Sarnoff","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3549932","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Based on conflicting Federal Circuit case law, many academics have written, and many practitioners likely believe, that claim meanings or their applications may expand over time for purposes of literal infringement. But this common wisdom is wrong. Under existing Federal Circuit rules, the first precedent controls in the event of a conflict over doctrine, unless and until reversed en banc. The first precedent on the issue, the 2000 Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc. case, held that claim scope does not reach after-arising technologies for literal infringement, and suggested that if it did then such claims would lack written description support. Under existing validity precedents, temporally expanding claim scope would violate both Section 112(a)'s enablement and written description requirements, as explicitly held in the 1977 In re Hogan decision and as implied by the more recent 2010 Ariad Pharmaceuticals v. Eli Lilly & Co. en banc decision. Further, were claims able to expand over time for literal infringement, they would violate the axiomatic equivalency of claim scope for validity and infringement. Once it is recognized that claim scope for literal infringement does not protect against after arising technologies, further resort will be made to seek such protection under the doctrine of equivalents. This will lead to increased uncertainty regarding the scope of patent protection. This article demonstrates that academics and practitioners may be confused regarding the U.S. law of literal infringement's temporal scope. It describes the conflicting cases that have led to that confusion. And it explains why Section 112(f)'s rule of construction for functional claiming language may be understood to limit all claim scope to temporally fixed, known-to-be equivalent technologies. The article concludes by noting potential conflict with the pioneering invention doctrine and concerns should the law be changed to permit claiming the future.","PeriodicalId":136014,"journal":{"name":"Sustainable Technology eJournal","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Correcting Misunderstandings of Literal Infringement Scope Regarding After-Arising Technologies Protected by the Doctrine of Equivalents\",\"authors\":\"Joshua D. 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Under existing validity precedents, temporally expanding claim scope would violate both Section 112(a)'s enablement and written description requirements, as explicitly held in the 1977 In re Hogan decision and as implied by the more recent 2010 Ariad Pharmaceuticals v. Eli Lilly & Co. en banc decision. Further, were claims able to expand over time for literal infringement, they would violate the axiomatic equivalency of claim scope for validity and infringement. Once it is recognized that claim scope for literal infringement does not protect against after arising technologies, further resort will be made to seek such protection under the doctrine of equivalents. This will lead to increased uncertainty regarding the scope of patent protection. This article demonstrates that academics and practitioners may be confused regarding the U.S. law of literal infringement's temporal scope. It describes the conflicting cases that have led to that confusion. And it explains why Section 112(f)'s rule of construction for functional claiming language may be understood to limit all claim scope to temporally fixed, known-to-be equivalent technologies. 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引用次数: 0
摘要
基于相互矛盾的联邦巡回法院判例法,许多学者已经写道,许多从业者可能认为,索赔的含义或其应用可能会随着时间的推移而扩大,以达到字面侵权的目的。但这种常识是错误的。根据现有的联邦巡回法院规则,在原则冲突的情况下,第一先例具有控制作用,除非并直到全院撤销。该问题的第一个先例是2000年先灵公司(Schering Corp.)诉安进公司(Amgen, Inc.)一案,该案件认为,索赔范围不属于字面侵权的后生技术,并建议,如果存在这种情况,则此类索赔将缺乏书面描述支持。根据现有的有效性先例,暂时扩大权利要求范围将违反第112(a)条的使能关系和书面描述要求,这在1977年的in re Hogan案判决中明确提出,在最近的2010年Ariad Pharmaceuticals诉Eli Lilly & Co.的一审判决中也有暗示。此外,如果权利要求能够随着时间的推移而扩展为字面侵权,它们将违反权利要求的有效性和侵权范围的公理等效性。一旦认识到字面侵权的索赔范围对出现后的技术不具有保护作用,就会进一步诉诸等同原则寻求这种保护。这将导致专利保护范围的不确定性增加。本文表明,学者和实践者可能对美国字面侵权法的时间范围感到困惑。它描述了导致这种混淆的相互矛盾的案例。它解释了为什么第112(f)条功能性权利要求语言的构建规则可以被理解为将所有权利要求范围限制在暂时固定的、已知等效的技术上。文章最后指出了与开创性发明原则的潜在冲突,并关注法律是否应该被修改以允许对未来提出权利要求。
Correcting Misunderstandings of Literal Infringement Scope Regarding After-Arising Technologies Protected by the Doctrine of Equivalents
Based on conflicting Federal Circuit case law, many academics have written, and many practitioners likely believe, that claim meanings or their applications may expand over time for purposes of literal infringement. But this common wisdom is wrong. Under existing Federal Circuit rules, the first precedent controls in the event of a conflict over doctrine, unless and until reversed en banc. The first precedent on the issue, the 2000 Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc. case, held that claim scope does not reach after-arising technologies for literal infringement, and suggested that if it did then such claims would lack written description support. Under existing validity precedents, temporally expanding claim scope would violate both Section 112(a)'s enablement and written description requirements, as explicitly held in the 1977 In re Hogan decision and as implied by the more recent 2010 Ariad Pharmaceuticals v. Eli Lilly & Co. en banc decision. Further, were claims able to expand over time for literal infringement, they would violate the axiomatic equivalency of claim scope for validity and infringement. Once it is recognized that claim scope for literal infringement does not protect against after arising technologies, further resort will be made to seek such protection under the doctrine of equivalents. This will lead to increased uncertainty regarding the scope of patent protection. This article demonstrates that academics and practitioners may be confused regarding the U.S. law of literal infringement's temporal scope. It describes the conflicting cases that have led to that confusion. And it explains why Section 112(f)'s rule of construction for functional claiming language may be understood to limit all claim scope to temporally fixed, known-to-be equivalent technologies. The article concludes by noting potential conflict with the pioneering invention doctrine and concerns should the law be changed to permit claiming the future.