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The Davidson–Quine Dispute on Meaning and Knowledge: A Concise Guide
The paper addresses the debate between Donald Davidson and W.V.O. Quine on the nature of meanings and knowledge. It is argued that Davidson’s misgivings, though interesting, are not devastating for Quine's version of empiricism, which is not easily translatable into traditional philosophical categories.
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