{"title":"用单项否决权维持更高的税收和更多的支出:刺痛的罕见事件","authors":"J. Douglas","doi":"10.1111/pbaf.12176","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The scholarly literature provides little evidence that the line‐item veto is used effectively by governors in the U.S. states to reduce budget totals or shrink the size of government. By examining the actions of five governors in four states, this study reveals that item vetoes have been used explicitly in several cases to maintain higher levels of taxation and spending. It concludes that under the right conditions at key moments in time the line item veto can be used by governors to have a decisive impact on state budget outcomes.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Maintaining Higher Taxes and Spending More with the Line‐Item Veto: Uncommon Events that Sting\",\"authors\":\"J. Douglas\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/pbaf.12176\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The scholarly literature provides little evidence that the line‐item veto is used effectively by governors in the U.S. states to reduce budget totals or shrink the size of government. By examining the actions of five governors in four states, this study reveals that item vetoes have been used explicitly in several cases to maintain higher levels of taxation and spending. It concludes that under the right conditions at key moments in time the line item veto can be used by governors to have a decisive impact on state budget outcomes.\",\"PeriodicalId\":117783,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking\",\"volume\":\"56 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/pbaf.12176\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pbaf.12176","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Maintaining Higher Taxes and Spending More with the Line‐Item Veto: Uncommon Events that Sting
The scholarly literature provides little evidence that the line‐item veto is used effectively by governors in the U.S. states to reduce budget totals or shrink the size of government. By examining the actions of five governors in four states, this study reveals that item vetoes have been used explicitly in several cases to maintain higher levels of taxation and spending. It concludes that under the right conditions at key moments in time the line item veto can be used by governors to have a decisive impact on state budget outcomes.