Armin Krieg, J. Grinschgl, C. Steger, R. Weiss, H. Bock, J. Haid
{"title":"mpsoc硬件/软件安全防护的系统侧信道泄漏仿真","authors":"Armin Krieg, J. Grinschgl, C. Steger, R. Weiss, H. Bock, J. Haid","doi":"10.1109/DDECS.2012.6219040","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"During recent years a tremendous number of embedded systems has been introduced into every person's house-hold. Such systems cannot only be found inside non-critical applications like entertainment devices but also in safety or security critical implementations like smart-cards. The increasing complexity leads to the introduction of several different co-design techniques to enable the parallel design of the system's hardware and software. Especially concerning security evaluation procedures this may raise a problem of trust between the manufacturer of the hardware and the software if both are different entities. To enable a bridge between these two worlds, simulation and emulation-based approaches have been shown in literature and industry to provide abstracted information about fault-attack effects to the software developer. However, no fast and cost-effective approach is available to provide a metric about how much of a given secret is leaking from the device to its environment. Therefore, this paper proposes such a metric and an emulation-based methodology to enable an early estimation of side-channel leakage to a possible adversary. The effectiveness of our approach is shown using a common available system-on-chip implementation using an open-source standard-cell library for characterization and a FPGA-based emulation platform for demonstration.","PeriodicalId":131623,"journal":{"name":"2012 IEEE 15th International Symposium on Design and Diagnostics of Electronic Circuits & Systems (DDECS)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"System side-channel leakage emulation for HW/SW security coverification of MPSoCs\",\"authors\":\"Armin Krieg, J. Grinschgl, C. Steger, R. Weiss, H. Bock, J. Haid\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/DDECS.2012.6219040\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"During recent years a tremendous number of embedded systems has been introduced into every person's house-hold. Such systems cannot only be found inside non-critical applications like entertainment devices but also in safety or security critical implementations like smart-cards. The increasing complexity leads to the introduction of several different co-design techniques to enable the parallel design of the system's hardware and software. Especially concerning security evaluation procedures this may raise a problem of trust between the manufacturer of the hardware and the software if both are different entities. To enable a bridge between these two worlds, simulation and emulation-based approaches have been shown in literature and industry to provide abstracted information about fault-attack effects to the software developer. However, no fast and cost-effective approach is available to provide a metric about how much of a given secret is leaking from the device to its environment. Therefore, this paper proposes such a metric and an emulation-based methodology to enable an early estimation of side-channel leakage to a possible adversary. The effectiveness of our approach is shown using a common available system-on-chip implementation using an open-source standard-cell library for characterization and a FPGA-based emulation platform for demonstration.\",\"PeriodicalId\":131623,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2012 IEEE 15th International Symposium on Design and Diagnostics of Electronic Circuits & Systems (DDECS)\",\"volume\":\"2 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2012-04-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2012 IEEE 15th International Symposium on Design and Diagnostics of Electronic Circuits & Systems (DDECS)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/DDECS.2012.6219040\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2012 IEEE 15th International Symposium on Design and Diagnostics of Electronic Circuits & Systems (DDECS)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DDECS.2012.6219040","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
System side-channel leakage emulation for HW/SW security coverification of MPSoCs
During recent years a tremendous number of embedded systems has been introduced into every person's house-hold. Such systems cannot only be found inside non-critical applications like entertainment devices but also in safety or security critical implementations like smart-cards. The increasing complexity leads to the introduction of several different co-design techniques to enable the parallel design of the system's hardware and software. Especially concerning security evaluation procedures this may raise a problem of trust between the manufacturer of the hardware and the software if both are different entities. To enable a bridge between these two worlds, simulation and emulation-based approaches have been shown in literature and industry to provide abstracted information about fault-attack effects to the software developer. However, no fast and cost-effective approach is available to provide a metric about how much of a given secret is leaking from the device to its environment. Therefore, this paper proposes such a metric and an emulation-based methodology to enable an early estimation of side-channel leakage to a possible adversary. The effectiveness of our approach is shown using a common available system-on-chip implementation using an open-source standard-cell library for characterization and a FPGA-based emulation platform for demonstration.