Lévi-Strauss’s Critique of Durkheim

Lévi-Strauss’s critique of Durkheim is considered an important one for two reasons. First, it is a discussion about the nature of social reality, and it therefore raises questions about the philosophical foundations of Durkheimian sociology. Second, it is regarded as a turning point in the French tradition of social anthropology, Lévi-Strauss’s purpose being to put forward structuralism as a solution to Durkheimian difficulties. In this chapter, first I outline Lévi-Strauss’s core arguments, and then I reassess the significance of his critique in light of the recent debates about his structuralist program in France. I will show that the orthodox view on the relation between the Durkheim school and Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism is oversimplified because it relies heavily on Lévi-Strauss’s own claims, and as a consequence, also oversimplifies Durkheim’s account of social reality. By examining concepts such as “symbolism,” “obligation,” “institution,” “norm,” and “action” in both Durkheim’s and Lévi-Strauss’s theory, I will show that Lévi-Strauss’s structuralist turn is in fact a cognitivist one, which, instead of offering solutions to Durkheimian questions, dismisses those questions.