Emotional Knowledge and the Emotional A Priori: Comments on Rick A. Furtak's Knowing Emotions

Furtak’s book is an enjoyable read. For much of it I found myself nodding in agreement. We all know that emotions involve physiological processes, and somehow provide us with information both about ourselves and the world. But how? Furtak has set out to explain how those “somatic agitations we feel when we are affectively moved might actually contribute to the ways that the emotions inform us about how things are in a world of concern” (40). It is a worthy goal. In the following comments, I will raise no major objection to Furtak’s main line of argument. My questions are essentially requests for clarification. They focus on three key expressions: first, the “unified” character of emotional agitation and intentionality; second, the unique “mode of cognition” claimed for emotions; and third, the “emotional a priori.” Abstract: In the following comments, I will raise no major objection to Furtak’s main line of argument. My questions are essentially requests for clarification. They focus on three key expressions: first, the “unified” character of emotional agitation and intentionality; second, the unique “mode of cognition” claimed for emotions; and third, the “emotional a priori.”