Securing On-chip Interconnect against Delay Trojan using Dynamic Adaptive Caging

With the progressive innovation of VLSI technology, Tiled Chip Multicore Processors (TCMP) have surfaced up as the backbone of the modern data intensive parallel multi-core systems. Network-on-Chip (NoC) is considered as the most preferred choice for on-chip communication. Manufacturers have begun to investigate the prospects of using third-party IP in sophisticated TCMP designs due to strict time-to-market limitations. The inflated reliance over third party IPs induced security vulnerabilities in inter-tile communication. In this paper, we implement a novel Hardware Trojan (HT) called as Delay Trojan (DT) placed in an NoC router. Proposed DT adds random delay to flits going through it, while other NoC routers merely experience regular congestion, making DT detection difficult. As a result, packets of latency-critical applications stalls impacting system performance and throughput. Further, we propose a dynamic adaptive learning framework embedded in NoC routers that detects DT with reasonable accuracy and alerts neighboring routers. We also propose a caging technique to re-route packets. Our experimental study evaluates the impact of DT and the effectiveness of the proposed solution.