{"title":"具有不可分割对象的破产问题的策略证明","authors":"Kazuhiko Hashimoto, Yukio Nakayama","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2740896","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We analyze bankruptcy problems with an indivisible object, where real owners and outside traders want to allocate an indivisible object among them with monetary compensation. The object might be a company that has gone bankrupt or a house left by a parent who has died, and so on. We show that there exists no rule satisfying strategy-proofness and the ownership lower bound on any domains that include at least three common preferences.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"44 7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Strategy-Proofness on Bankruptcy Problems with an Indivisible Object\",\"authors\":\"Kazuhiko Hashimoto, Yukio Nakayama\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2740896\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We analyze bankruptcy problems with an indivisible object, where real owners and outside traders want to allocate an indivisible object among them with monetary compensation. The object might be a company that has gone bankrupt or a house left by a parent who has died, and so on. We show that there exists no rule satisfying strategy-proofness and the ownership lower bound on any domains that include at least three common preferences.\",\"PeriodicalId\":410371,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"44 7 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-02-29\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2740896\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2740896","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Strategy-Proofness on Bankruptcy Problems with an Indivisible Object
We analyze bankruptcy problems with an indivisible object, where real owners and outside traders want to allocate an indivisible object among them with monetary compensation. The object might be a company that has gone bankrupt or a house left by a parent who has died, and so on. We show that there exists no rule satisfying strategy-proofness and the ownership lower bound on any domains that include at least three common preferences.