具有不可分割对象的破产问题的策略证明

Kazuhiko Hashimoto, Yukio Nakayama
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文分析了具有不可分割物的破产问题,其中实际所有者和外部交易者希望以货币补偿的方式在他们之间分配不可分割物。对象可能是一家破产的公司,或者父母去世后留下的房子,等等。我们证明,在包含至少三个共同偏好的任何领域上,不存在满足策略证明性和所有权下界的规则。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Strategy-Proofness on Bankruptcy Problems with an Indivisible Object
We analyze bankruptcy problems with an indivisible object, where real owners and outside traders want to allocate an indivisible object among them with monetary compensation. The object might be a company that has gone bankrupt or a house left by a parent who has died, and so on. We show that there exists no rule satisfying strategy-proofness and the ownership lower bound on any domains that include at least three common preferences.
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