权益证明共识机制中的权益池敲诈

Alpesh Bhudia, A. Cartwright, E. Cartwright, J. Hernandez-Castro, D. Hurley-Smith
{"title":"权益证明共识机制中的权益池敲诈","authors":"Alpesh Bhudia, A. Cartwright, E. Cartwright, J. Hernandez-Castro, D. Hurley-Smith","doi":"10.1109/COINS54846.2022.9854946","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Cryptocurrencies to date, most notably Bitcoin, have primarily relied on a proof-of-work system to validate and process transactions on the blockchain. Proof-of-work systems have, however, several limitations, such as enormous energy demands, and so are likely to be replaced by proof-of-stake systems. These systems use a mechanism that does not rely on mining power but the amount of stake owned by a node, allowing randomly selected validators to create blocks and verify blocks created by other validators. Proof-of-stake systems naturally result in staking pools where in a third party organisation operates validators on behalf of investors who have staked in the currency. Given they have oversight for a large amount of staked currency, staking pools are a prime target for malicious actors. In this paper we explore the economic implications of an attack on a staking pool. We pay particular attention to how the staking pool and clients could resolve an extortion attack by a malicious actor who has accessed relevant signing keys.","PeriodicalId":187055,"journal":{"name":"2022 IEEE International Conference on Omni-layer Intelligent Systems (COINS)","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Extortion of a Staking Pool in a Proof-of-Stake Consensus Mechanism\",\"authors\":\"Alpesh Bhudia, A. Cartwright, E. Cartwright, J. Hernandez-Castro, D. Hurley-Smith\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/COINS54846.2022.9854946\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Cryptocurrencies to date, most notably Bitcoin, have primarily relied on a proof-of-work system to validate and process transactions on the blockchain. Proof-of-work systems have, however, several limitations, such as enormous energy demands, and so are likely to be replaced by proof-of-stake systems. These systems use a mechanism that does not rely on mining power but the amount of stake owned by a node, allowing randomly selected validators to create blocks and verify blocks created by other validators. Proof-of-stake systems naturally result in staking pools where in a third party organisation operates validators on behalf of investors who have staked in the currency. Given they have oversight for a large amount of staked currency, staking pools are a prime target for malicious actors. In this paper we explore the economic implications of an attack on a staking pool. We pay particular attention to how the staking pool and clients could resolve an extortion attack by a malicious actor who has accessed relevant signing keys.\",\"PeriodicalId\":187055,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2022 IEEE International Conference on Omni-layer Intelligent Systems (COINS)\",\"volume\":\"54 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-08-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2022 IEEE International Conference on Omni-layer Intelligent Systems (COINS)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/COINS54846.2022.9854946\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2022 IEEE International Conference on Omni-layer Intelligent Systems (COINS)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/COINS54846.2022.9854946","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

摘要

迄今为止,加密货币,尤其是比特币,主要依赖于工作量证明系统来验证和处理区块链上的交易。然而,工作量证明系统有一些局限性,比如巨大的能源需求,因此很可能被权益证明系统所取代。这些系统使用的机制不依赖于挖矿能力,而是依赖于节点拥有的权益,允许随机选择的验证者创建区块并验证其他验证者创建的区块。权益证明系统自然会产生权益池,其中第三方组织代表持有该货币的投资者运营验证器。鉴于他们对大量的赌注货币进行监督,赌注池是恶意行为者的主要目标。在本文中,我们探讨了对押注池的攻击的经济含义。我们特别关注权益池和客户端如何解决已访问相关签名密钥的恶意行为者的勒索攻击。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Extortion of a Staking Pool in a Proof-of-Stake Consensus Mechanism
Cryptocurrencies to date, most notably Bitcoin, have primarily relied on a proof-of-work system to validate and process transactions on the blockchain. Proof-of-work systems have, however, several limitations, such as enormous energy demands, and so are likely to be replaced by proof-of-stake systems. These systems use a mechanism that does not rely on mining power but the amount of stake owned by a node, allowing randomly selected validators to create blocks and verify blocks created by other validators. Proof-of-stake systems naturally result in staking pools where in a third party organisation operates validators on behalf of investors who have staked in the currency. Given they have oversight for a large amount of staked currency, staking pools are a prime target for malicious actors. In this paper we explore the economic implications of an attack on a staking pool. We pay particular attention to how the staking pool and clients could resolve an extortion attack by a malicious actor who has accessed relevant signing keys.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信