{"title":"不断发展的技术和标准监管","authors":"Luís M. B. Cabral, D. Salant","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1120862","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The EU mandated a single standard for second generation wireless telecommunications, whereas the US allowed several incompatible standards to battle for market share. Motivated by this example, we argue that a single standard leads to a free riding problem, and thus to a significant decrease in marginal incentives for R&D investment. In this context, keeping two separate standards may be a necessary evil to sustain a high level of R&D expenditures. We also provide conditions such that a non-standardization equilibrium is better for consumers and for society as a whole.","PeriodicalId":124312,"journal":{"name":"New York University Stern School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2008-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"72","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Evolving Technologies and Standards Regulation\",\"authors\":\"Luís M. B. Cabral, D. Salant\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1120862\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The EU mandated a single standard for second generation wireless telecommunications, whereas the US allowed several incompatible standards to battle for market share. Motivated by this example, we argue that a single standard leads to a free riding problem, and thus to a significant decrease in marginal incentives for R&D investment. In this context, keeping two separate standards may be a necessary evil to sustain a high level of R&D expenditures. We also provide conditions such that a non-standardization equilibrium is better for consumers and for society as a whole.\",\"PeriodicalId\":124312,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"New York University Stern School of Business Research Paper Series\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2008-04-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"72\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"New York University Stern School of Business Research Paper Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1120862\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"New York University Stern School of Business Research Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1120862","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The EU mandated a single standard for second generation wireless telecommunications, whereas the US allowed several incompatible standards to battle for market share. Motivated by this example, we argue that a single standard leads to a free riding problem, and thus to a significant decrease in marginal incentives for R&D investment. In this context, keeping two separate standards may be a necessary evil to sustain a high level of R&D expenditures. We also provide conditions such that a non-standardization equilibrium is better for consumers and for society as a whole.