{"title":"如果你想让我留下来，就付钱:中央集权国家的不对称联邦制模式","authors":"P. Claeys, F. Martire","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1304045","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Highly centralised countries like Italy and Spain have devolved fiscal power to regions in an asymmetric way. Some well-off regions get transfers that turn them into net recipients of the fiscal system. We demonstrate in a political economy model of fiscal federalism that in centralised countries, side-payments are used to compensate regions that are set back by the fiscal system and can credibly threaten to secede. Compensation blocks political negotiation on alternative – more efficient – fiscal systems. We study two regions, Valle d’Aosta in Italy and País Vasco in Spain, as an example.","PeriodicalId":447069,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Structure","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"If You Want Me to Stay, Pay: A Model of Asymmetric Federalism in Centralised Countries\",\"authors\":\"P. Claeys, F. Martire\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1304045\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Highly centralised countries like Italy and Spain have devolved fiscal power to regions in an asymmetric way. Some well-off regions get transfers that turn them into net recipients of the fiscal system. We demonstrate in a political economy model of fiscal federalism that in centralised countries, side-payments are used to compensate regions that are set back by the fiscal system and can credibly threaten to secede. Compensation blocks political negotiation on alternative – more efficient – fiscal systems. We study two regions, Valle d’Aosta in Italy and País Vasco in Spain, as an example.\",\"PeriodicalId\":447069,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Structure\",\"volume\":\"31 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2015-03-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Structure\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1304045\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Structure","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1304045","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
If You Want Me to Stay, Pay: A Model of Asymmetric Federalism in Centralised Countries
Highly centralised countries like Italy and Spain have devolved fiscal power to regions in an asymmetric way. Some well-off regions get transfers that turn them into net recipients of the fiscal system. We demonstrate in a political economy model of fiscal federalism that in centralised countries, side-payments are used to compensate regions that are set back by the fiscal system and can credibly threaten to secede. Compensation blocks political negotiation on alternative – more efficient – fiscal systems. We study two regions, Valle d’Aosta in Italy and País Vasco in Spain, as an example.
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