{"title":"具有普遍非竞争的排他性商品的成本分担机制","authors":"Tatsuhiro Shichijo, Emiko Fukuda","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2694899","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Both excludable public goods with non-rivalry and private goods with network externalities have a coordination problem.<br><br>In this study, we define generalized non-rivalry to investigate coordination mechanisms for both types of goods.<br><br>We focus on the equal cost-sharing with maximal participation (ECSMP) mechanism, which has been studied as a mechanism for excludable public goods with non-rivalry, and we find that this mechanism is optimal with respect to two welfare criteria in an environment with generalized non-rivalry. Moreover, we characterize the ECSMP mechanism within this environment.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Cost-Sharing Mechanism for Excludable Goods With Generalized Non-Rivalry\",\"authors\":\"Tatsuhiro Shichijo, Emiko Fukuda\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2694899\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Both excludable public goods with non-rivalry and private goods with network externalities have a coordination problem.<br><br>In this study, we define generalized non-rivalry to investigate coordination mechanisms for both types of goods.<br><br>We focus on the equal cost-sharing with maximal participation (ECSMP) mechanism, which has been studied as a mechanism for excludable public goods with non-rivalry, and we find that this mechanism is optimal with respect to two welfare criteria in an environment with generalized non-rivalry. Moreover, we characterize the ECSMP mechanism within this environment.\",\"PeriodicalId\":393761,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-06-27\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2694899\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2694899","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Cost-Sharing Mechanism for Excludable Goods With Generalized Non-Rivalry
Both excludable public goods with non-rivalry and private goods with network externalities have a coordination problem.
In this study, we define generalized non-rivalry to investigate coordination mechanisms for both types of goods.
We focus on the equal cost-sharing with maximal participation (ECSMP) mechanism, which has been studied as a mechanism for excludable public goods with non-rivalry, and we find that this mechanism is optimal with respect to two welfare criteria in an environment with generalized non-rivalry. Moreover, we characterize the ECSMP mechanism within this environment.