EmPoWeb:通过浏览器扩展增强Web应用程序

Doliére Francis Somé
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引用次数: 30

摘要

浏览器扩展是与浏览器紧密集成的第三方程序,它们以更高的权限执行,以便为用户提供额外的功能。与web应用程序不同,扩展不受同源策略(Same Origin Policy, SOP)的约束,因此可以在任何web应用程序上读写用户数据。他们还可以访问敏感的用户信息,包括浏览历史,书签,凭证(cookie)和已安装的扩展列表。只要安装在用户的浏览器中,它们就可以访问一个永久存储空间,在其中存储数据。它们可以触发任意文件的下载并将其保存在用户的设备上。出于安全考虑,浏览器扩展和web应用程序在不同的上下文中执行。尽管如此,在所有主流浏览器中,扩展和web应用程序都可以通过交换消息进行交互。通过这些通信通道,web应用程序可以利用扩展特权功能,从而访问和泄露敏感的用户信息。在这项工作中,我们分析了Chrome、Firefox和Opera浏览器扩展提供给web应用程序的通信接口。因此,我们确定了web应用程序可以利用的许多扩展来访问特权功能。通过扩展的api, web应用程序可以绕过SOP,访问任何其他web应用程序上的用户数据,访问用户凭据(cookie)、浏览历史记录、书签、已安装扩展列表、扩展存储,并下载和保存用户设备中的任意文件。我们的研究结果表明,浏览器扩展和web应用程序之间的通信对浏览器、web应用程序,更重要的是对用户构成了严重的安全和隐私威胁。我们讨论了对策和建议,并相信我们的研究,特别是我们用来检测和利用这些威胁的工具,可以作为浏览器供应商扩展审查过程的一部分,帮助他们识别和修复上述扩展中的问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
EmPoWeb: Empowering Web Applications with Browser Extensions
Browser extensions are third party programs, tightly integrated to browsers, where they execute with elevated privileges in order to provide users with additional functionalities. Unlike web applications, extensions are not subject to the Same Origin Policy (SOP) and therefore can read and write user data on any web application. They also have access to sensitive user information including browsing history, bookmarks, credentials (cookies) and list of installed extensions. They have access to a permanent storage in which they can store data as long as they are installed in the user's browser. They can trigger the download of arbitrary files and save them on the user's device. For security reasons, browser extensions and web applications are executed in separate contexts. Nonetheless, in all major browsers, extensions and web applications can interact by exchanging messages. Through these communication channels, a web application can exploit extension privileged capabilities and thereby access and exfiltrate sensitive user information. In this work, we analyzed the communication interfaces exposed to web applications by Chrome, Firefox and Opera browser extensions. As a result, we identified many extensions that web applications can exploit to access privileged capabilities. Through extensions' APIS, web applications can bypass SOP and access user data on any other web application, access user credentials (cookies), browsing history, bookmarks, list of installed extensions, extensions storage, and download and save arbitrary files in the user's device. Our results demonstrate that the communications between browser extensions and web applications pose serious security and privacy threats to browsers, web applications and more importantly to users. We discuss countermeasures and proposals, and believe that our study and in particular the tool we used to detect and exploit these threats, can be used as part of extensions review process by browser vendors to help them identify and fix the aforementioned problems in extensions.
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