新时代的旗手?:印度新监管机构的演变(1991-2016)

Arun K. Thiruvengadam
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引用次数: 1

摘要

本章提供了一个批判性的、描述性的描述,描述了自20世纪90年代初印度中央政府启动了一系列新的经济政策以来,一些精选的国家监管机构的出现。可以说,这些机构的创建和演变从根本上改变了印度行政法的格局,其意义和影响有待仔细研究和理解。在描述影响这些新监管机构形成和演变的因素时,我分析了它们的原始设计,并批判性地评估了它们在其存在的四分之一世纪中的功能。1991年的重大事件预示着经济、政治和法律领域的一系列变化,一些人认为这些变化“改变了印度的日常生活”。这些事件的四分之一世纪纪念日为反思和审查其后果提供了一个有利的机会。与其他司法管辖区一样,印度“监管国家”的特点是:市场的作用扩大,私营部门更多地参与社会的各个方面,国家从直接提供服务中退出,并作为主要雇主。据说,新的监管国家的动机是一种愿望,至少是一些主要参与者密切关注的愿望,即“更多地依赖与政府保持一定距离的机构,不受日常政治压力的影响,并将其决策纳入技术专长”(杜巴什和摩根,2013年,3)。是希望新的监管机构能将无可救药的政治化治理文化转变为一种在设计和运作上受规则约束、不涉及政治和技术官僚主义的治理文化。本章的组织如下:第1节侧重于印度宪法的制定者如何构思经济监管,并回顾了独立后直到20世纪90年代初的经济监管经验,然后详细介绍了新出现的监管机构,并分析了它们的一些结构特征、权力、能力和局限性。尽管作为一个整体处理新的监管机构,但重点是三个部门:电信、电力和证券部门。第2节在提出解决这些监管机构所面临的问题的一些方法之前,从概念上和被纳入印度新监管机构的角度分析了独立性的概念。我认为,随着这些监管机构的成熟,并进入下一个发展阶段,需要对任命过程和被选为监管机构的人给予更多的关注。迫切需要专业知识和技能。以退休公务员为主的现行体制有必要进行检讨和改革。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Flag-Bearers of a New Era?: The Evolution of New Regulatory Institutions in India (1991-2016)
This chapter provides a critical, descriptive account of the emergence of a select few regulatory state institutions in India since the early 1990s, when the national government initiated a series of new economic policies. The creation and evolution of these institutions has arguably altered the landscape of Indian administrative law in fundamental ways, the significance and impact of which has yet to be carefully studied and understood. In describing the factors that influenced the formation and evolution of these new regulatory institutions, I analyse their original design and critically assess their functioning across the quarter century of their existence. The momentous events of 1991 heralded a series of changes in the economic, political and legal landscape that some believe ‘transformed India in the everyday’. The quarter century anniversary of those events provides an auspicious occasion to reflect upon and review their consequences. The Indian ‘regulatory state’ is characterized, as in other jurisdictions, by: an expanded role for markets, greater private sector participation in all facets of societies, and withdrawal of the state from the direct provision of services and as the dominant employer. The new regulatory state is said to have been motivated by a desire, held closely by at least some of its principal actors, for ‘greater reliance on institutions operating at arm’s length from government, insulated from daily political pressures, and embedding their decisions in technical expertise’ (Dubash and Morgan 2013, 3). A principal objective, apparently, was the hope that the new regulatory institutions would transform what was a hopelessly politicized governance culture into one that was rule-bound, apolitical and technocratic in its design and operation. The chapter is organized as follows: Section 1 focuses on the way the framers of the Indian constitution conceived of economic regulation, and reviews the post-independence experience with economic regulation until the early 1990s, before detailing the new regulatory institutions that emerged and analyzing some of their structural features, powers, capacities and limitations. Although dealing with new regulatory institutions as a whole, the focus is on three sectors: telecom, electricity and the securities sectors. Section 2 unpacks the concept of independence both conceptually and as it has been incorporated into the new regulatory institutions in India, before suggesting some ways to resolve the problems that these regulatory institutions have confronted. I argue that as these regulatory institutions mature and move into the next phase of their evolution, far greater attention needs to be paid to the appointments process and the persons who are selected as regulators. There is a dire need for specialized knowledge and skills. The current system where mostly retired bureaucrats are appointed to these positions needs to be reviewed and changed.
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