通过NAS中的零信任框架保护基于轨迹的操作

Larry D. Nace
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引用次数: 1

摘要

美国联邦航空局目前的战略目标包括向基于轨迹的作战(TBO)过渡,整合基于时间的管理数据和工具,以提高效率并降低国家空域系统(NAS)的运营成本。在TBO下,跨各种FAA系统的集成将比以往任何时候都更加重要。为了在不影响数据和工具可用性的情况下确保这种集成的安全性,FAA应该考虑在NAS中采用零信任框架(ZTF)。ZTF建立在这样一种信念之上,即仅依靠强大的边界安全保护(传统上称为城堡护城河方法)已不足以保护关键数据免受外部威胁,并且随着威胁的不断演变,假定网络边界内的污染已经存在(见图1)。为了解决这个问题,理论家开发了一个框架,在该框架中,信任受到控制,并应用于所有内部网络设备、用户、以及所谓的“永不信任;“始终验证”方法来区分想要访问网络数据的授权元素和未授权元素。为了确保TBO目标的实现并增加防御深度以应对潜在的内部威胁,FAA必须考虑实施ZTF理论的混合方法。这将包括继续使用FAA电信基础设施(FTI)网络提供的现有边界保护,以及在所谓的NAS零信任扩展(ZTX)平台中应用ZTF所提供的额外强度。本文讨论了一种实现混合ZTX方法来保护NAS中的TBO基础设施和应用程序的建议。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Securing Trajectory based Operations Through a Zero Trust Framework in the NAS
Current FAA strategic objectives include a migration to Trajectory Based Operations (TBO) with the integration of time-based management data and tools to increase efficiencies and reduce operating costs within the National Airspace System (NAS). Under TBO, integration across various FAA systems will take on greater importance than ever. To ensure the security of this integration without impacting data and tool availability, the FAA should consider adopting a Zero Trust Framework (ZTF) into the NAS.ZTF was founded on the belief that strong boundary security protections alone (traditionally referred to as the castle-moat approach) were no longer adequate to protecting critical data from outside threats and, with ever-evolving threat sophistication, contamination within a network perimeter is assumed to already exist (see Figure 1).To address this, theorists developed a framework where trust is controlled and applied to all internal network devices, users, and applications in what was termed a "Never Trust; Always Verify" approach to distinguish the authorized from the unauthorized elements wanting to access network data.To secure achievement of TBO objectives and add defensive depth to counter potential insider threats, the FAA must consider implementing a hybrid approach to the ZTF theory. This would include continued use of existing boundary protections provided by the FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI) network, with the additional strength afforded by the application of ZTF, in what is called the NAS Zero Trust eXtended (ZTX) platform.This paper discusses a proposal to implement a hybrid ZTX approach to securing TBO infrastructure and applications in the NAS.
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