在一个相互依存的世界里,各国政府能负起责任吗?

R. Rose
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文扩展了传统的负责任政党政府模型,考虑了跨国约束对国家民选政府的影响。它首先系统地比较了国家政党政府的封闭模式与受制于相互依存世界约束的执政党模式。欧盟的制约因素同时通过理事会产生非国家化的影响,通过欧洲议会产生多国效应,并形成雄心勃勃的经济技术官僚。在更广泛的欧洲或全球范围内的机构中,相互依存关系增加了,市场和非国家犯罪的跨国影响可以在没有任何正式机构负责或控制的情况下运作。作为选民在一系列未能满足国家偏好的政党之间轮换选择的替代方案,结论提出了一个学习模型,通过该模型,政党和选民可以调整期望以满足相互依赖的约束。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Can National Governments Be Responsible in a World of Interdependence?
This paper expands the conventional model of responsible party government to take into account the effect of trans-national constraints on nationally elected governments. It starts by systematically comparing the closed model of national party government with that of a governing party subject to the constraints of a world of interdependence. European Union constraints concurrently exert a denationalizing influence through the Council, a multinational effect through the European Parliament, and an aspiring economic technocracy. Interdependence is increased in institutions of a wider Europe or global in scope, and trans-national influences of markets and non-state crime can operate without any formal institution being accountable or in control. As an alternative to electorates rotating their choice between a succession of parties that fail to meet national preference, the conclusion proposes a learning model by which parties and voters may adapt expectations to meet the constraints of interdependence.
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