{"title":"在一个相互依存的世界里,各国政府能负起责任吗?","authors":"R. Rose","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2323432","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper expands the conventional model of responsible party government to take into account the effect of trans-national constraints on nationally elected governments. It starts by systematically comparing the closed model of national party government with that of a governing party subject to the constraints of a world of interdependence. European Union constraints concurrently exert a denationalizing influence through the Council, a multinational effect through the European Parliament, and an aspiring economic technocracy. Interdependence is increased in institutions of a wider Europe or global in scope, and trans-national influences of markets and non-state crime can operate without any formal institution being accountable or in control. As an alternative to electorates rotating their choice between a succession of parties that fail to meet national preference, the conclusion proposes a learning model by which parties and voters may adapt expectations to meet the constraints of interdependence.","PeriodicalId":166531,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Interdependence (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Can National Governments Be Responsible in a World of Interdependence?\",\"authors\":\"R. Rose\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2323432\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper expands the conventional model of responsible party government to take into account the effect of trans-national constraints on nationally elected governments. It starts by systematically comparing the closed model of national party government with that of a governing party subject to the constraints of a world of interdependence. European Union constraints concurrently exert a denationalizing influence through the Council, a multinational effect through the European Parliament, and an aspiring economic technocracy. Interdependence is increased in institutions of a wider Europe or global in scope, and trans-national influences of markets and non-state crime can operate without any formal institution being accountable or in control. As an alternative to electorates rotating their choice between a succession of parties that fail to meet national preference, the conclusion proposes a learning model by which parties and voters may adapt expectations to meet the constraints of interdependence.\",\"PeriodicalId\":166531,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"PSN: Interdependence (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2012-09-27\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"PSN: Interdependence (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2323432\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PSN: Interdependence (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2323432","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Can National Governments Be Responsible in a World of Interdependence?
This paper expands the conventional model of responsible party government to take into account the effect of trans-national constraints on nationally elected governments. It starts by systematically comparing the closed model of national party government with that of a governing party subject to the constraints of a world of interdependence. European Union constraints concurrently exert a denationalizing influence through the Council, a multinational effect through the European Parliament, and an aspiring economic technocracy. Interdependence is increased in institutions of a wider Europe or global in scope, and trans-national influences of markets and non-state crime can operate without any formal institution being accountable or in control. As an alternative to electorates rotating their choice between a succession of parties that fail to meet national preference, the conclusion proposes a learning model by which parties and voters may adapt expectations to meet the constraints of interdependence.