竞争者之间的团购:权力结构的决定因素

Ke Fu, Guoming Lai, Weixin Shang, Jiayan Xu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

相互竞争的公司可能会参与团购,以从共同供应商那里获得数量折扣。在行业实践中,有两种主流的权力结构:纳什式团购,即两个相互竞争的企业拥有相似的权力;斯塔克尔伯格式团购,即一家企业作为领导者发起团购合同。我们研究了竞争对手的权力结构如何影响其团购行为和所有利益相关者(包括供应商、两家公司和最终消费者)的绩效。本文首次研究了B2B环境下竞争对手之间的权力结构对团购的影响。我们采用了一个博弈论框架,在这个框架中,两个面临古诺竞争的公司可以在比个人购买更有利的情况下组合购买。作为该框架的一部分,我们基于企业赋予的权力结构对企业团购进行了建模。对于每一种权力结构,我们推导了均衡企业行为,并刻画了企业具有团购激励的条件。我们比较了不同权力结构下企业的团购行为和团购绩效,论证了权力结构的决定因素:不同的权力结构可能从根本上改变企业的团购激励。此外,不同的权力结构导致不同的联合绩效,任何一种团购形式都不能主导其他团购形式。我们的研究结果表明,竞争企业之间的纳什团购或斯塔克尔伯格团购都可能比个人购买实现帕累托改进,即各方都更富裕。一个独特的见解是,当两家公司的市场基础高度不对称时,由于严重的合作竞争冲突,纳什团购是不可能实现的,只有斯塔克尔伯格团购可能。此外,在一定条件下,在所有权力结构中,小企主导的Stackelberg团购(即小企率先行动并作为领导者)可以达到帕累托最优。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Group Buying between Competitors: The Determinant of Power Structure
Competing firms may engage in group buying to benefit from quantity discount from the common supplier. There are two prevailing power structures in industry practice: Nash group buying in which two competing firms possess similar powers, and Stackelberg group buying in which one firm serves as the leader to initiate group buying contract. We investigate how the competitors' power structure affects their group buying behaviors and the performances of all stakeholders (including the supplier, the two firms, and the end consumers). Our paper is the first to study the impact of power structure on group buying between competitors in B2B context. We employ a game-theoretic framework in which two firms facing Cournot competition can group their purchase if it is beneficial over individual purchasing. As part of the framework, we model firms' group buying based on their endowed power structures. For each power structure, we derive equilibrium firm behaviors and characterize the conditions under which firms have a group buying incentive. We compare the group buying behaviors and performances across different power structures and demonstrate the determinant of power structure: Different power structures may fundamentally alter firms' group buying incentives. Furthermore, different power structures lead to different joint performance and neither form of group buying can dominate the others. Our results suggest that either Nash or Stackelberg group buying between competing firms may achieve Pareto improvement over individual purchasing in the sense that all the parties are better off. One distinctive insight is that when the two firms are highly asymmetric in their market bases, Nash group buying is unattainable due to severe co-opetition conflict and only Stackelberg group buying may be possible. Moreover, under certain conditions, the smaller-firm-led Stackelberg group buying (i.e., the smaller firm moves first and acts as the leader) can be Pareto optimal among all power structures.
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