退出vs语音

Eleonora Broccardo, Oliver Hart, Luigi Zingales
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引用次数: 52

摘要

我们研究了退出(撤资和抵制)和发声(参与)策略在促进公司社会期望结果方面的相对有效性。我们表明,在竞争激烈的世界中,在推动企业以对社会负责的方式行事方面,退出的效果不如声音的效果。此外,我们证明,加入退出策略的个人激励不一定与社会激励一致,而当充分多元化的投资者被允许表达自己的声音时,它们是一致的。我们讨论了社会和法律方面的考虑有时可能使退出比发声更可取。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Exit vs. Voice
We study the relative effectiveness of exit (divestment and boycott) and voice (engagement) strategies in promoting socially desirable outcomes in companies. We show that in a competitive world exit is less effective than voice in pushing firms to act in a socially responsible manner. Furthermore, we demonstrate that individual incentives to join an exit strategy are not necessarily aligned with social incentives, whereas they are when well-diversified investors are allowed to express their voice. We discuss what social and legal considerations might sometimes make exit preferable to voice.
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