基于仿真的多比特故障注入的破坏者自动定位

J. Grinschgl, Armin Krieg, C. Steger, R. Weiss, H. Bock, J. Haid
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引用次数: 21

摘要

近年来,对片上系统(SoC)设计的可靠性和安全性要求急剧增加。可靠性和安全性这两个领域都与随机或故意性质的操作错误有关。在前一种情况下,随机故障,例如由辐射或退化效应引起的故障,可能导致执行错误和可能的严重后果。安全领域更关注攻击者在物理攻击期间故意注入的错误,以将系统带入意外状态。这种设计对故障的抵抗力可以在早期设计阶段使用故障注入方法进行模拟。对于这些方法,被测设计增加了额外的电路来模拟预定位置的故障。一种方法使用破坏者,在正常运行时是透明的元件,如果激活则会出现故障,将其放置到目标系统中。如果这个放置过程中包含大量破坏者,那么硬件描述操作可能对设计工程师来说是一个挑战。因此,本文提出了一种利用破坏者技术进行断层注入评估的自动定位方法。自动化过程允许有效地安置大量破坏者。这使设计人员能够在使用基于fpga的功能仿真的早期设计阶段评估大量不同的可靠性和故障攻击场景。选定的案例研究展示了如何以一种有效的方式将此方法应用于通用的通用架构。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Automatic saboteur placement for emulation-based multi-bit fault injection
During recent years the dependability and security requirements of system-on-chip (SoC) designs have increased tremendously. Both, dependability and security, domains are concerned with operational faults of a random or intentional nature. In former case random faults e.g. caused by radiation or degradation effects could lead to execution errors with possible dramatic results. The security domain is more concerned with intentional faults injected by an adversary during a physical attack to drive the system into an unintended state. The resistance of such a design against faults can be emulated during early design phases using fault injection methods. For these methods the design-under-test is augmented with additional circuitry to emulate faults at predestined locations. One method uses saboteurs, elements that are transparent during normal operation and faulty if activated, are placed into the target system. If this placement process includes a high number of saboteurs, the hardware description manipulation could be a challenge for the design engineer. Therefore this paper presents an automatic placement methodology for fault injection evaluations using saboteur techniques. The automatized process allows for the efficient placement of large amounts of saboteurs. This enables the designer to evaluate a high number of different dependability and fault attack scenarios during early design phases using FPGA-based functional emulation. Selected case studies show how this approach can be applied to a common general purpose architecture in an efficient way.
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