贷款腐败与银行贷款合同:跨国证据

Liangliang Jiang, Jeffrey Ng, Chong Wang
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引用次数: 5

摘要

贷款腐败是银行面临的一个重要的代理问题。根据世界银行《商业环境调查》的数据,我们发现,在贷款腐败现象较为严重的国家,银行向借款人提供的贷款条件更为优惠。当企业面临更多融资约束时,这种关系更强,这与腐败在债务资本供应收紧时获得有利贷款条件的重要性是一致的。与监督约束代理问题的预期一致,这种关系在银行外资持股比例较高或以新教为主要宗教的国家较弱。在银团贷款市场,参与银行倾向于在贷款腐败更为普遍的国家减少贷款。腐败更严重的国家的公司更喜欢私人银行债务,而不是公共债券,而且杠杆率更高。在贷款腐败较多的国家,银行的贷款质量较差,盈利表现较差,在金融危机期间更容易遇到麻烦。总体而言,我们的研究结果表明,腐败对借款人有利,但对银行股东不利。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Lending Corruption and Bank Loan Contracting: Cross-Country Evidence
Lending corruption is an important agency problem for banks. Using data from the World Bank Business Environmental Survey, we find that in countries with more lending corruption, banks give more favorable loan terms to borrowers. This relation is stronger when firms are under more financing constraints, consistent with corruption being important to obtaining favorable loan terms when the supply of debt capital is tighter. In line with the expectation that monitoring constrains agency problems, this relation is weaker in countries with higher foreign ownership of banks or where Protestantism is the primary religion. In the syndicated loan market, participant banks are inclined to lend less in countries where lending corruption is more prevalent. Firms in countries with greater corruption prefer private bank debt over public bonds and are more leveraged. Banks in countries with more lending corruption have poor loan quality, worse earnings performance, and are more susceptible to trouble during a financial crisis. Overall, our findings suggest that corruption greases the wheels for borrowers but is detrimental to bank shareholders.
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